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This dissertation is composed of three chapters. In the first chapter, I estimate the effect of
China’s reserve intervention on the Renminbi-Dollar exchange rate and the trade balance
in a partially identified vector autoregression. Exogenous reserve intervention is identi-
fied by exploiting the exchange rate regime shift of July 21st, 2005. In particular, I exploit
the fact that policy is entirely passive in the fixed exchange rate regime, while it is not in
the managed float. I analyze the impact of public saving, via reserve intervention, on the
economy’s net external position to determine the contribution of policy to global imbal-
ances. My estimates indicate that a surprise purchase of 24.2 Billion USDs depreciates the
bilateral Renminbi-Dollar rate by about 1% on impact and that this depreciation is highly
persistent. The effect on the trade balance is statistically insignificant and economically
small in contrast to what is postulated by a growing recent theoretical literature.
In the second chapter, my co-author and I document, using a newly constructed his-
torical dataset, gross bank credit flows for the state of New York between 1912 and 1932.
We focus our analysis on this historical period due to the unit banking structure of the
financial sector. The lack of branching allows us to measure heterogeneity in credit expan-
sion and contraction across banks to a finer degree. We find higher levels of gross credit
creation, destruction and excess reallocation than those documented in the literature. In
addition, we document how the cyclical properties and relative volatility of credit creation
and destruction vary across collateralized and uncollateralized lending.
In the third chapter, my co-authors and I provide empirical evidence documenting
how price dispersion moves with the business cycle in the airline industry. Performing a
fixed-effects panel analysis on seventeen years of data covering two business cycles, we
find that price dispersion is highly pro-cyclical. This effect is especially pronounced for
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legacy carriers relative to low-cost carriers. We show that our empirical result is consistent
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CHAPTER 1
Global Imbalances and Reserve Intervention: Identifying the Impact
of Chinese Exchange Rate Policy
1.1 Introduction
A striking feature of the last two decades has been the parallel rise of global imbalances
and the rapid accumulation of foreign exchange (FX) assets in a number of emerging
economies. China, in particular, has accumulated FX assets1 at an impressive rate in this
period and largely in parallel to persistent current account surpluses. The rationale be-
hind this saving behavior of emerging economies has been a hotly debated issue in the
profession and policy circles (Bernanke (2005)). Part of the literature emphasizes struc-
tural characteristics (Carroll and Jeanne (2009), Caballero and Gourinchas (2008)) intrinsic
to these surplus economies that induce agents to save. The unifying feature of this litera-
ture is that the saving rate is determined by the behavior of the private sector. The fact that
the vast majority of these savings are channeled via the formal sector into FX reserves is
happenstance in most of these models (Mendoza and Rios-Rull (2007) being an exception).
A diametrically opposite explanation, often referred to as “neo mercantilism” (Dooley and
Garber (2003))2, argues instead that the accumulation of FX reserves is the thrust of global
imbalances. In particular, this theory suggests that it is public sector saving, in the form
of FX accumulation by emerging market Central Banks, that is the driving force of the ob-
served saving patterns. It is therefore in these policy decisions and not in private sector
saving behavior that global imbalances have their origin.
1In a slight abuse of terminology I use throughout the paper the terms FX intervention, FX accumulation,
reserve intervention, reserve accumulation and FX asset purchases interchangeably.
2A third explanation for this phenomenon attributes the rise of global imbalances to structural changes
occurring in the deficit countries. See for example Engel and Rogers (2006)
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This paper seeks to contribute to this literature by empirically measuring the effective-
ness of FX intervention in inducing improvements in the trade balance. The relevance of
the “neo mercantilistic” hypothesis is inherently tied to this parameter. In fact, if the effect
of FX intervention on the trade balance is small then policy cannot be the main determinant
of the observed saving patterns. To do this, I identify exogenous purchases of FX assets by
the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) and study the dynamic response of the bilateral RMB-
USD spot rate and the trade balance to such a shock. I investigate this causal mechanism
using China as a case study for essentially four reasons: (i) China is the largest holder of FX
reserves worldwide and has built up these reserves largely in parallel to a string of trade
surpluses, (ii) the PBoC uses FX purchases in the onshore FX interbank market to guide the
bilateral onshore RMB-USD exchange rate (iii) all models that emphasize the importance
of this causal channel require a form of friction between domestic and foreign currency
bonds. China naturally fits this requirement since its capital control measures limit the
domestic sector’s ability to access international financial markets (Jeanne (2012), Bacchetta
et al. (2013)), (iv) the policy relevance of China in the debate on global imbalances and FX
accumulation.
To my knowledge, this is one of the first papers that attempts to empirically measure
this causal link between FX intervention and the trade balance. Other papers (Aizenman
and Lee (2007), Cheung and Ito (2009)) have used panel and cross-sectional methods to
measure the importance of FX accumulation on the current account and/or trade balance
over the medium run. However, their regression estimates confound the direct effect of FX
intervention on the trade balance with feedback effects arising from the endogenous policy
reaction of the Central Bank. Thus in the same way that regressing the federal funds rate
against output growth cannot inform us about the effect of monetary policy surprises, a
regression of FX intervention on the trade balance cannot identify the effect of FX interven-
tion. With the exception of Bayoumi et al. (2015), therefore, this previous literature3 mea-
3In fairness, part of these papers were not written with the intention to tease out causality from the reduced
form relationship, but rather to document the correlates of the current account and/or trade balance in the
medium run.
2
sures reduced form correlations while my work attempts to quantify a casual mechanism.
In addition to the effect of FX intervention on the trade balance, my empirical approach
also estimates the effect of FX intervention on the exchange rate. There is a large empirical
literature that attempts to estimate this parameter (Sarno and Taylor (2001)). However, this
literature identifies the effect of FX intervention in open economies with a free floating ex-
change rate. I identify this parameter in a country with a controlled exchange rate regime
and closed capital account. Thus, the resulting estimates have fundamentally different in-
terpretations.
The structural VAR approach I follow explicitly allows for there to be simultaneous
determination between the trade balance, FX intervention and the exchange rate. Identi-
fication of the model is achieved by exploiting the shift in the exchange rate regime that
occurred on July 21st, 2005. In particular, identification is achieved as follows. First, I es-
timate the conditional variance of FX intervention in the fixed exchange rate regime. In
this period, aggregate USD inflows, capital controls and restrictions on domestic holding
of foreign assets forced the PBoC to passively absorb the excess supply of USDs onshore
via FX intervention. In this policy regime, FX intervention is only endogenously deter-
mined, as the PBoC only intervenes to implement the peg to the USD. Thus this reduced
form variance identifies variation in FX intervention that is driven by fundamental shocks
other than the policy shock. Second, the main identifying assumption is that this variance
is constant across exchange rate regimes. Third, in the managed float regime, FX interven-
tion is determined by both endogenous policy - as before - and exogenous FX purchases
driven by policy shocks. Knowledge of the magnitude of this endogenous variation al-
lows me to partition total FX variation into endogenous and exogenous components and
identify the parameters of the policy equation. Fourth, subject to the assumption that the
Central Bank acts to stabilize the RMB-USD rate in response to fundamental shocks (i.e.
“leans against the wind”), I show that the policy function parameters are globally identi-
fied. Intuitively, the identification strategy recovers the direct effect of FX intervention by
expressing priors over the sign and size of the feedback effects that confound the inference.
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To preview my results, I find that in response to an exogenous purchase by the PBoC
of 24.2 Billion USD the bilateral RMB-USD rate will depreciate by 1% on impact. The de-
preciation is highly persistent and is statistically significant for at least 2 years after the
initial shock. The effect on the trade balance, however, is economically small (-97.2 Mil-
lion USDs). At the posterior mode, this effect is economically small not only on impact
but as well for the whole first two years after the policy shock. In terms of the per dol-
lar effectiveness of FX intervention on the trade balance, at the mode the impact effect is
approximately zero and it remains of economically small magnitudes (less than 0.1 per
dollar of FX intervention) even at longer impact horizons. Looking at the distribution of
this parameter, in the 68% highest likelihood set of models, the largest positive impact ef-
fect estimates that the trade balance improves only by ten cents (0.1 USD) for every dollar
of FX intervention. When I compute this same measure over longer horizons I find similar
results. In particular, I compute the effectiveness of FX intervention on the trade balance
over a 2 year period successive to the initial policy shock. In the 68% highest likelihood set
of models, the largest effect I find is an increase of about 0.1 dollars in the trade balance for
every dollar of FX intervention. These results suggest that surprise purchases of FX affect
the onshore RMB-USD rate in the expected direction but do not have any economically
significant effects on the trade balance. Though my estimates only identify the effect of
surprise FX intervention, the results I have illustrated do not support the current formula-
tion of the “neo mercantilistic” hypothesis.
The results outlined above also have important implications for international policy
coordination. In fact, under the neo-mercantilistic hypothesis, the policy maker may use
a combination of foreign asset purchases and capital controls to influence its external bal-
ance. This is effectively a form of untargeted export subsidy (Korinek and Serven (2010),
Jeanne (2012)) and the trade distortions that it induces are forbidden under World Trade
Organization regulations. From this point of view then, the case for common rules on capi-
tal account policies seems no different than that on trade policies. My estimates inform this
debate by showing that, in fact, such policies do not seem to be effective in this dimension.
Further, though current account imbalances have been largely tempered as a consequence
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of the financial crisis, the explicit pursuit of FX accumulation policies by emerging market
economies appears to be by no means over. Dominguez et al. (2012) document that while
reserve accumulation has considerably slowed or even reversed during the crisis, from
2011 onward there has been a return to pre-crisis trends. Thus, the decade-long upsurge in
global reserve assets seems likely to endure in this coming decade and understanding the
impact and spillovers of such FX intervention policies remains of paramount importance.
Literature: This paper is related to a number of literatures. First, this paper is related to
the literature on FX intervention in emerging market economies. It is, on the one hand,
related to the empirical work of Disyatat and Galati (2007) and Adler and Tovar (2011)
on the role reserves play in resisting appreciation and capital inflows. On the other hand,
it is related to the theoretical literature on sterilized FX accumulation that clarifies under
what assumptions public flows can affect private consumption-saving decisions in a small
open economy. This work stresses the importance of imperfect capital mobility and studies
the effect of reserve policy on consumption, exchange rates and interest rates (Aguair and
Amador (2011), Benigno and Fornaro (2012), Jeanne (2012), Kumhof (2010)).
This paper is also related to the mercantilistic hypothesis of Dooley and Garber (2003),
the related literature on exchange rate undervaluation (Rodrik (2008)) and the precau-
tionary savings approach to reserves (Jeanne and Ranciere (2011)). In the first literature,
reserve accumulation emerges as the outcome of a policy directed to resist currency ap-
preciation and promote export led growth. Korinek and Serven (2010) analyze such an
economy with a learning-by-investing externality and characterize its welfare properties.
The authors find that the social planner’s optimal policy leads to both higher consump-
tion growth and faster output growth in equilibrium. Rodrik (2008) similarly documents
that countries with depreciated real exchange rates achieve faster growth in the data. The
combination of these literatures provides the rationale for active reserve policy. The first
explains what possible externalities the policy maker internalizes by pursuing active pol-
icy; the second argues that the precautionary paradigm cannot explain the reserve build
up of this decade.
This work is also connected to the literature on global imbalances. This set of papers
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explains current account surpluses in ’catch-up’ countries through aggregate risk (Jeanne
(2007), Jeanne and Ranciere (2011)), idiosyncratic risk (Carroll and Jeanne (2009)) and fi-
nancial market imperfections (Caballero and Gourinchas (2008)) or a combination of them
(Mendoza and Rios-Rull (2007)). Differently from the explanation emphasized in this pa-
per, in these models, reserve accumulation emerges as a consequence of the private sector’s
saving decision as these savings are channeled through the official sector into reserves. In
this explanation, the role of policy, as emphasized above, is completely absent. Further-
more, these are explanations that characterize the long run behavior of economies rather
than short-medium run fluctuations implicitly studied in this paper.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes the empirical
model. Section 1.3 illustrates the identification argument and the assumptions. Section 1.4
describes the estimation strategy. Section 1.5 illustrates my measure of FX intervention.
Section 1.6 discusses the empirical results. Section 1.7 discusses supporting evidence for
my identifying assumptions. Section 1.8 makes concluding remarks.
1.2 Empirical approach
In this section, I first describe the structure of FX markets in China to help motivate my
VAR specification. Second, I describe the behaviour of the RMB-USD exchange rate in my
sample period.
1.2.1 VAR specification
FX markets in China are structured as a two-tier system comprised of a retail market and
an interbank market4. In the lower tier of the system, the retail market, firms and individ-
uals demand and supply FX exclusively to a set of designated banks. These designated
FX banks and the PBoC form the upper tier of the system that is the onshore FX interbank
market. The crucial characteristic of this onshore FX market is that existing regulations
4The regulations that separate these two trading venues have been gradually changing. For example, since
August 2005 non-financial firms that earn and spend FX may directly trade in the interbank market. For details
see Jikang and Yuanyuan (2006).
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segment it from offshore demand and supply conditions5. Thus, if under the prevailing
onshore spot rate a net excess supply (demand) of USDs arises in the interbank market,
there will be pressure for the onshore RMB-USD rate to appreciate (depreciate).
Over the period in question, China has been subject to large net inflows of USDs aris-
ing from a combination of pronounced and persistent current account surpluses and net
capital inflows. Due to restrictions on FX holdings by domestic entities, such as the com-
pulsory FX settlement system6, these USD inflows percolate into the onshore FX interbank
market as firms and investors surrender USDs to the designated FX banks in exchange for
RMBs. In turn, these banks use the interbank market to square off their FX positions de-
rived from these retail trades. This combination of restrictions on FX holdings and the FX
market structure imply that the consolidated net supply (demand) of USDs in the onshore
interbank market is inherently connected to China’s net external position. Due to the sur-
pluses recorded during the period in question, FX banks as a whole consistently supplied
USDs to the onshore interbank market.
When such an imbalance occurs, the only source of demand for this onshore supply of
USDs is ultimately the PBoC. Hence, due to its predominant demand role in this market,
the PBoC uses FX intervention to curb the excess USD supply in the interbank market and
influence the equilibrium onshore rate. These USD purchases are then sterilized through
the issuance of Central Bank bills in order to control the money supply (Aizenman and
Glick (2009), Ouyang et al. (2010), Zhang (2010). Therefore, throughout the paper, I will
use the term FX intervention to signify sterilized FX intervention.
In light of the discussion above, consider the following demand and supply model of the
5For more details on the various forms of interaction between onshore and offshore markets, see The off-
shore Renminbi, by HSBC Global Research
6Under the FX purchase and sale system, exporters and foreign investors must surrender at least 75%
of their FX earning to designated FX banks. These banks must, in turn, sell their foreign exchange on the
interbank FX market.
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onshore FX interbank market7:
α1It = st − st|t−1 − α2TBt − εDt (1.1)
It = β0 + β1st + β2TBt + ε1,t (1.2)
TBt = γ0 + γ1st + γ2It + ε2,t (1.3)
where It is the level of FX purchases
8 measured in USDs undertaken by the PBoC during
month t, TBt is the trade surplus (deficit) at month t measured in USDs and st is the log
of the onshore RMB-USD spot rate measured on the last day of the month. Finally, s̄t|t−1 is
the PBoC’s exchange rate target. The spot rate and the policy target are expressed in local
currency units per dollar. Therefore, an increase (decrease) reflects a depreciation (appre-
ciation) of the RMB. Positive (negative) FX interventions measure purchases (sales) of FX
assets by the PBoC. Positive (negative) values for TBt are surpluses (deficits).
Equation (1.1) is the policy reaction function of the PBoC or the demand equation with
associated policy shock εDt . In each exchange rate regime, the PBoC pursues a policy path
s̄t|t−1 that it implements using FX interventions to influence the onshore RMB-USD rate,
st. In particular, in response to appreciation (depreciation) pressure the PBoC intervenes in
the interbank market by buying (selling) USDs. These dollars are successively reinvested
in FX assets which, in fact, form a sizeable component of the asset side of the PBoC’s bal-
ance sheet. The extent to which the PBoC reacts to appreciation/depreciation pressures is
measured by the parameter α1. As the value of this parameter increases in absolute value,
the policy maker’s demand for FX becomes more elastic and the exchange rate becomes
more “market determined”. On the other hand, at α1 = 0, demand for FX is perfectly
inelastic and the policy maker fully determines the exchange rate. In the terminology of
the literature, this parameter captures the degree to which Central Banks lean against the
wind.
7Here, I ignore any lags that may be needed in the specification of this model for brevity. The identification
problem and approach remain unchanged with the inclusion of lags in the system formed by (1.1), (1.2), (1.3).
8The construction of the FX intervention variable is discussed in detail in Section 1.5
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The policy path - s̄t|t−1 - captures the broad trend of the exchange rate regime and
is assumed to be, at least, contemporaneously exogenous. In the fixed exchange rate pe-
riod this holds trivially as it is constant. After the July 2005 revaluation, it captures the
predictable appreciation trend followed by the PBoC9. I also assume that the PBoC sets
this policy path in terms of the bilateral RMB-USD rate. This is a natural assumption to
make. In fact, Chinese authorities have used the USD as a benchmark to value the RMB
at least since 1994, and held a de facto peg against the dollar from 1997 to July 2005. Af-
ter the July 2005 revaluation, they have explicitly managed the appreciation against the
dollar using daily central parity announcements by the China Foreign Exchange Trading
Center (CEFTC) to guide the onshore rate and curbed bilateral volatility by imposing trad-
ing band limits for the onshore RMB-USD10. Finally, in response to the financial crisis, the
PBoC once again pegged its exchange rate against the USD.
Equation (1.2) is the supply equation. In particular, this equation describes the net sup-
ply of USDs arising from the consolidated dollar position across FX banks. Even though
domestic agents and FX banks are individually constrained by regulation in their ability
to hold dollars, in aggregate, this supply function must depend on the exchange rate. Fur-
ther, for a constant exchange rate the supply of USDs in the onshore FX interbank market
also depends on China’s trade position since this is one of the major sources of USDs in-
flows. Finally, equation (1.3) describes the dependence of the trade balance on the other
endogenous variables. Cleary, it will depend on both the exchange rate since the two are
jointly determined in equilibrium and FX interventions as suggested by Jeanne (2012) and
Benigno and Fornaro (2012).
1.2.2 Exchange rate regimes in China
In figure 1.1, I have plotted the time-series of the onshore RMB-USD rate for the sample
period under study. From visual inspection it is clear that the most prominent feature of
9I implicitly assume in the VAR specification that this policy path is accurately captured by the lagged
realized values of the exchange rate or other lagged variables. Regressing the end of month central parity rate
on the lagged end of month realized onshore rate the R2 is of 99.6%
10For example, see figure 2 in Frenkel and Wei (2007). The bilateral exchange rate volatility against the dollar
is far less pronounced than that against the Euro and the Yen.
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the data is the shift in the exchange rate regime occurring on July 21st 2005. On this date,
the PBoC revalued the Chinese currency against the USD by approximately 2% after hav-
ing held it fixed at 8.28 RMB/USD since 1997. Further, the PBoC also publicly announced
that it had shifted its exchange rate from a de facto peg to the USD to a managed float.
Thus, the period under study presents a clear structural break in policy occurring around
the middle of the sample that divides it into two distinct exchange rate regimes. The first
regime extends from January 1998, the start of my sample, to June 2005 and throughout the
exchange rate remains fixed. From July 2005 onward, instead, the PBoC has implemented
a managed float around a gradual and highly predictable appreciation path11.
Though the July 2005 revaluation is the most prominent feature of the sample, two
other policy interventions occurred in the period under study. First, a caveat to my di-
chotomous characterization of the sample is represented by the period between October
2008 and May 2010. During this period, the PBoC effectively re-pegged the RMB to the
dollar in response to the global financial crisis and the steep fall in world trade. Further,
the spot rate volatility declined sharply. Second, in conjunction with the July 2005 reval-
uation, the PBoC established daily fluctuation limits (±0.3%) for the onshore RMB-USD
rate around a central parity rate announced each day by the CEFTC. In the managed float
sample I study, the PBoC widened these bands twice. A first change was implemented
in May 2007 widening the trading band to ±0.5%. A second in April 2012 widening it to
±1%12.
This change in the daily trading band limits may affect the monthly volatility in the
RMB-USD rate making it unstable over time. In practice, I find that at the monthly fre-
quency the point estimates of the residual variances in these three samples are almost
identical13. This is likely due to the fact that the trading bands govern intraday variation
of the RMB-USD rate. The CEFTC, instead, controls day to day changes of the central par-
11Note that this distinction in the exchange rate regime is de facto. De jure, the regime has been a managed
float throughout the period under analysis. For details, a PBoC statement on the policy stance is available here
12A third adjustment was made in March 2014 which is however outside of my sample period
13The estimated conditional standard deviations are respectively 0.46%, 0.45% and 0.41%.
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ity rate and through this mechanism the month to month RMB-USD rate variation. It is,
in fact, the month to month variation in these announced rates that explains the vast ma-
jority of the onshore RMB-USD movements14 at the monthly level rather than the intraday
variation that is susceptible to the trading band limits.
In this paper, therefore, I exploit the July 2005 exchange rate regime shift to identify my
econometric model. In particular, I assume that the change in the reduced form moments
across regimes stems only from a break in the parameters governing the policy equation of
the PBoC. I ignore changes in the daily trading band limits as these don’t seem to impact
my model which is specified at the monthly level. With regards to the crisis period, I ini-
tially include this period in the managed float regime. However, in section 1.6.1 I perform
various robustness checks to show how this assumption influences my results.
1.3 Identification
In this section, I first illustrate the problem of identification in structural VARs. Second,
I show that under my identifying assumptions, the policy shock of interest is identified.
Third, I discuss the plausibility of my identifying assumptions. Fourth, I highlight similar-
ities and differences between my identification strategy and those adopted by the existing
literature.
1.3.1 The VAR Identification Problem
Consider a general p lag structural VAR form:
A0Yt = κ+A1Yt−1 + ...+ApYt−p + εt (1.4)
where Yt is N×1 data vector, κ is N×1 vector of constants, Ai is a N×N matrix of structural
coefficients and the structural shocks, εt are distributed N(0, D), where D is diagonal. The
14At the monthly level, the variation in the central parity rate accounts for almost 90% of the variation in the
onshore RMB-USD exchange rate. Further, the difference between the two standard deviations is in the order
of .05%.
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Yt = c+B1Yt−1 + ...+BpYt−p + ut (1.6)
where c is vector of constants, Bi is a N × N matrix of reduced form coefficients and the
reduced form errors, ut, are distributed N(0,Σ).
The VAR identification problem is the impossibility to recover uniquely the matrices
governing (1.4) from (1.6). This lack of identification can be illustrated by examining the
reduced form covariance term Σ. Consider a matrix pair (QA0, QDQ
T ) such that QA0 6=
A0, QDQ
T 6= D and Q is a full rank matrix. By definition:










so that premultiplication of (1.4) by a full rank matrix Q will yield the same reduced form
as the original model (A0,D). More precisely, there exists an uncountable set of matrix pairs
(Ã0, D̃), each corresponding to a different structural VAR, that satisfy (1.7). Thus, without
further assumptions, (A0, D) cannot be recovered from the reduced form covariance term
alone.
An equivalent implication of equations (1.5) and (1.6) is that the reduced form errors




Knowledge of A0 identifies the structural shocks in (1.10) and, as above, the structural
form in (1.4). In this case, the VAR will be fully identified since all structural shocks are
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recovered from the reduced form errors. However, (1.10) also implies that knowledge of
the i-th row of A0 alone recovers the i-th structural shock. In this case, (1.4) is partially
identified since the i-th structural shock is recovered, while the model is agnostic about
the remaining N − 1 shocks.
1.3.2 Identification of the policy shocks
In this section I establish that the policy shock is identified. I do this in two steps. First,
under my identifying assumptions a submatrix of the reduced form covariance matrix is
a function of strict subset of the parameters governing the structural VAR. Crucially, this
subset includes the parameters of the policy equation. Second, there exists a mapping from
the reduced form moments in the two submatrices - one per regime - to this subset. This
mapping only identifies the parameters in the policy equation, and therefore, my struc-
tural VAR is partially identified.






































where the shocks εt are distributed N(0, D
(i)), and D(i) is a block diagonal matrix15. In
fact, I assume that the policy shock εDt is fundamental in nature and therefore orthogonal
to both ε1,t and ε2,t. However, I allow ε1,t and ε2,t to be correlated to each other. In (1.11),
the superscript (i) indexes the parameters which are allowed to vary across exchange rate











1 as well as all intercepts,
κ(i), and lagged effects, A
(i)
j , may be different before and after the policy shift.
15The first upper left block is a scalar containing the variance of the policy shock, σ
2,(i)
D . The second block is
2× 2 matrix with the variances σ21 and σ
2
2 on the diagonal and the covariance term σ1,2 off diagonal.
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note that g(•) is a function of parameters which are assumed to remain constant across
regimes. On the other hand, h(i)(•) depends on parameters that may vary across regimes.
Finally, let Σ(i) denote the reduced form covariance matrix of (1.11). Denote with Σ
(i)
S the
2× 2 upper left submatrix of Σ(i) that includes the variance of the exchange rate, the vari-
ance of FX intervention and their covariance.
Claim: Given the model in (1.11) and the identifying assumptions listed below, it possible
to identify the effect of a policy shock on the exchange rate, FX intervention and the trade
balance in the managed float regime.
Assumption 1: α
(i)
2 = 0 in both regimes. I assume that the PBoC contemporaneously only
reacts to deviations of the exchange rate from its target.
Assumption 2: α
(1)
1 = 0 in the fixed exchange rate regime. I assume that the PBoC had a
perfectly elastic demand for FX at the target exchange rate.
Assumption 3: σ
(1)
D = 0 in the fixed exchange rate regime. There were no policy shocks in
the implementation of the fixed exchange rate target.
Assumption 4: g(•) is constant across regimes.
Assumption 5: α
(2)
1 ≤ 0 in the managed float regime. The PBoC accommodates shocks by
leaning against the wind.
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D are all known. Therefore




D . I show below how these can be
recovered.
Sketch of Proof: In general, the elements of Σ(i) will be a function of all elements in Φ(i).




D is to realize
that, under assumption 1, it possible to express the submatrix Σ
(i)





D and the functions h



























In light of the exchange rate regime shift, the model in (1.11) implies that reduced form
covariance matrix may differ across regimes. Let Σ(1) denote the covariance matrix in the
fixed exchange period and Σ(2) that in the managed float period. Both of these matrices
will contain submatrices Σ
(i)
S like (1.14), since assumption 1 holds in both periods. Further,
under assumptions 1,2 and 3, the variance of the exchange rate and the covariance with FX
intervention are both equal to zero17 in the fixed exchange rate period. Thus the submatrix
Σ
(1)










This occurs because I have assumed that (i) the PBoC has perfectly elastic demand for FX
at the target exchange rate (α
(1)
1 = 0), and (ii) there are no policy surprises in the fixed
exchange rate regime (σ
(1)
D = 0). In this policy regime, therefore, there is no variation in
the exchange rate since (i) implies that the exchange rate is exogenous and (ii) that the
16Derivations are given in Appendix
17Derivations are given in Appendix.
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exogenous variation is zero. Further, FX intervention is entirely passive since the PBoC
only makes FX purchases to implement the peg. As a result, the residual variation in FX
intervention directly identifies g(•). Intuitively, the function g(•) measures the total varia-
tion in FX intervention that arises from shocks other than the policy shock. Since there are
no policy shocks in the fixed exchange rate regime and policy is entirely passive, it must
be that g(•) is identified by the reduced form of (1.15). Further, because there is no varia-




1 cannot be identified. As a consequence,





D can be recovered by noting that there exists a mapping be-










(2)(•), g(•). Solving this system of non-linear equations produces estimates of




D , as well as values for h
(2)(•) and g(•). From above, it fol-




D in conjunction with assumption 1 identifies the policy
shock in the managed float period. On the other hand, knowledge of h(2)(•) and g(•)
alone is insufficient to identify the underlying parameters of these functions, so the other
shocks remain unidentified. Thus the VAR is partially identified.
This non-linear equation system has two properties: (i) its solution is generally not





Assumptions 3 is sufficient to guarantee uniqueness of the solution in a non-trivial subset





independently it is possible that no solution exist to the equation system. This occurs be-
cause the estimate of g(•) implied by Σ(1)S lies outside the feasible space of parameters
given Σ
(2)
S . Neither of these issues bind for the baseline results in section 1.6, however, the
lack of uniqueness may bind when using a very diffuse prior as I do in section 1.6.1.
Finally note that despite knowledge of the policy parameters in the fixed exchange
rate regime, the effect of a policy shock is not identified. In fact, in the fixed exchange
rate regime, the policy variance is zero. Thus, without independent variation in FX inter-
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ventions, the IRFs of the endogenous variables to the policy shock remain unidentified. A
count of the full set of moments and unknowns suggests that the entire model, in fact, may
be identified. I choose not pursue this for the following reason. Intuitively, policy shocks
are identified because policy is entirely passive in the fixed exchange rate regime and it is
not in managed float. This distinction identifies the policy shock from the other two shocks
but not the other two shocks from each other. In a small VAR, such as the one I estimate,
it is thus preferable to impose as little structure on these remaining shocks as possible. In
fact, it may be that the remaining reduced form shocks cannot be orthogonalized into a set
of structural shocks each with a clear, distinct interpretation18.
1.3.3 Identifying assumptions
I now proceed to discuss the plausibility of the identifying assumptions.
Assumption 1: α
(i)
2 = 0 in both regimes. I assume that the PBoC contemporaneously only
reacts to deviations of the exchange rate from its target.
In the fixed exchange rate regime, the assumption holds since the exchange rate is ex-
ogenously determined and fixed. In the managed float regime assumption 1 is sensible for
the following reasons. First, to the extent that the PBoC’s objective is to stabilize the ex-
change rate (Chang et al. (2013)), FX interventions should only respond to deviations from
the PBoC’s target rate. Any attempt to use FX purchases to stabilize both the exchange rate
and the trade balance inherently trades off volatility in the exchange rate against volatility
in the trade balance. Second, while the stabilizing effect of FX purchases on the exchange
rate is immediate, a nominal depreciation may, at least initially, deteriorate the trade bal-
ance before inducing an improvement. Thus, at least in the short-run, it is unclear to what
extent FX intervention is an effective instrument to influence the trade balance. Third, in an
environment with information lags the PBoC may not directly react to the trade balance
simply because it does not contemporaneously observe it (or it observes it imprecisely).
18For example, one may think of the shocks ε1t , ε
2
t as combinations of fundamental shocks. If these combi-
nations overlap then ε1t and ε
2
t will be in fact correlated.
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These three reasons suggest that, within the month, the PBoC uses FX interventions only
(or predominantly) to stabilize the exchange rate. However, it chooses the policy path of
the exchange rate in function of lagged realizations of the trade balance. For example, the
PBoC chooses to steepen the appreciation path in response to a protracted period of large
trade surpluses or to slow it in response to a series of negative shocks.
Assumption 2: α
(1)
1 = 0 in the fixed exchange rate regime. I assume that the PBoC had a
perfectly elastic demand for FX at the target exchange rate.
Assumption 3: σ
(1)
D = 0 in the fixed exchange rate regime. There were no policy shocks in
the implementation of the fixed exchange rate target.
Assumptions 2 and 3 are made to reflect the state of policy in the fixed exchange rate
regime. By definition, under a fixed exchange rate regime, any supply or demand im-
balance in the onshore FX interbank market must be fully accommodated. Thus demand
must be perfectly elastic at the target rate. Further, exogenous FX intervention does not
occur because it is incompatible with the fixed exchange rate target of the PBoC. In fact,
ceteris paribus, exogenous FX intervention by the PBoC would have driven the onshore rate
away from the target exchange rate. Note that in the data, the RMB-USD exchange rate is
not entirely fixed. The residual standard deviation of the RMB-USD rate between January
1998 and July 2005 is of 0.05137%. If I exclude observations prior to January 1999, this con-
ditional standard deviation falls to 0.008407%. The difference between the two estimates is
driven by three observations in the first year of the sample in which the bilateral exchange
rate moved from 8.2770 to 8.28 RMB/USD (or vice versa). In both cases, the residual vari-
ance is sufficiently small that my assumptions are, to a first approximation, reasonable.
Assumption 4: g(•) is constant across regimes
This the potentially controversial element of my identification strategy. This assump-
tion is a crucial step in my identification strategy as it links the reduced forms across
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regimes. Without this assumption, the simultaneity between the spot rate and FX inter-
ventions in the managed float period cannot be disentangled since the policy shift con-
tains no identifying information. The fundamental concern with this assumption is that
the shift in exchange rate regime may also alter the behavior of economic agents (Lucas
(1972)). I argue below, however, that the size of the policy shift, capital controls and the
PBoC’s policy in the aftermath of the revaluation in great part attenuate these concerns.
As well, I investigate the extent to which violations of assumption 4 affect the results. I
assume that the value of g(•) across regimes is related by some random variable ς . The
choice of prior for this random variable can be used to model the researcher’s uncertainty
around assumption 4. For example, an infinitely diffuse prior is equivalent to rejecting it,
while a relatively tight prior centered around 1 assumes that the assumption almost holds.
The results of this exercise are discussed in section 1.6.1.
The vast majority of USD inflows into the onshore FX interbank market are tied to
capital inflows and trade inflows into China. Thus, my identification strategy fails to the
extent that the policy shift affects the conditional volatility of these net inflows. However,
in standard open economy models (Vegh (2013)), the exchange rate regime and fundamen-
tal volatility are usually separately modeled. By construction, in these models, a change
in the exchange rate regime affects only the intensity with which FX interventions and/or
the exchange rate adjust in response to fundamental shocks. Shock volatility is unchanged
across regimes since it is exogenous. As well there is empirical evidence that the volatility
of macro aggregates does not change when moving from fixed to floating (Duarte (2003)).
In my application, therefore, it seems equally reasonable to assume that, for example, real-
side shocks, such as productivity or demand shocks, affecting the onshore USD supply
may be well described by such a stylized model. However, a concern still remains that
the policy shift may have affected market participant’s incentive to increases speculative
pressures on the onshore RMB-USD rate. In particular, their incentive to invest in onshore
RMB denominated assets.
Before and after the July revaluation, the RMB remained substantially undervalued
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against the USD according to market participants. Thus incentives to hold long-term RMB
positions were largely unchanged in response to the policy shift. However, the change in
the exchange rate regime may have intensified speculative USD inflows by investors who
perceived the probability of another imminent revaluation to be higher after July 21, 2005.
The extent to which this increase in speculative activity may affect the net USD onshore
supply volatility, however, is limited by two factors: first, existing capital account regu-
lations in China limit the ability of foreigners to both obtain RMB assets in exchange for
FX and to quickly reverse cross-border positions. For example, assets purchased under
the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (QFII) program - the main investment vehicle
for foreign financial entities in China - may not be repatriated prior to a predetermined
amount of time19. Further, each authorized financial institution is subject to an investment
quota limit. Though these regulations may be circumvented, their mere existence certainly
hinders speculative activity as they have allowed the PBoC to keep control of the nominal
exchange rate, despite a certain amount of monetary policy independence. Second, the
incentive for foreign investors to circumvent the capital controls is directly related to the
probability that another large revaluation occur in the period subsequent to the July 21st,
2005 intervention. However, in the days successive to the shift in the exchange rate regime
the PBoC clearly signaled it would not allow large and sharp changes in the bilateral RMB-
USD rate. In the PBoC release of July 21, 2005 itself, the PBoC emphasized its responsibility
to keep the “[...] the RMB exchange rate basically stable at an adaptive and equilibrium level
[...]”20. As well, the Chinese official media attempted to cool appreciation expectation by
noting that “ [...] expectation for a bigger appreciation of the yuan’s vale was, and will be,
unrealistic. [...]” as reported by the China Daily editorial of July 22, 2005. Finally, currency
traders reported that the PBoC intervened heavily on July 22, 2005 to keep the currency
from appreciating and hitting the top of its trading band. Such an event, in the mind of
many market participants, would have triggered expectations of further appreciation of
the currency. To the extent that the PBoC was successful in coordinating expectations, this
19Lock up periods typically range from 3 months to 1 year counted from the day the principal is remitted in
full. Further, QFII status has to be granted by the State Administration for Foreign Exchange (SAFE) so that at
any point in time the number of foreign investors is fixed.
20The quote is from the Public Announcement of the People’s Bank of China on Reforming the RMB Ex-
change Rate Regime dated July 21st, 2005 available here. Emphasis is added.
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mechanism also acts to constraint the magnitude of the change in the USD inflow volatility.
Further, while capital controls and expectation coordination act to limit the change in
the USD inflow volatility for a given size of the policy shift, I also argue that the policy shift
in question was itself small. In the spectrum of exchange rate regimes (Levy-Yeyati and
Sturzenegger (2005)), the policy change can be characterized as a rather minor move to-
wards a more flexible arrangement. In fact, the conditional monthly standard deviation of
the RMB-USD rate in the managed float regime remained low21 and paired with substan-
tial FX intervention. A small change in the policy stance is also consistent with the history
of economic reforms of the country and policy statements of Chinese officials. In fact, it is
conventional wisdom that Chinese authorities prize stability and implement gradual pol-
icy change (Frenkel and Wei (2007)). To the extent that a small regime discontinuity also
induces small expectation-formation effects on the model parameters as in Leeper and Zha
(2003), then inference in my model remains approximately correct.
Assumption 5: α
(2)
1 ≤ 0 in the managed float regime. The PBoC accommodates shocks by
leaning against the wind.
Assumption 5, in my view, reflects the consensus of the FX intervention literature. In
fact, empirically, researchers tend to find that Central Banks across countries lean against
the wind (Sarno and Taylor (2001)). The assumption is highly plausible also from a theo-
retical perspective. In fact, if α1 were strictly greater than zero this would imply that the
PBoC uses FX interventions to accentuate the effect of shocks on the exchange rate. Given
the explicit goal of the PBoC to maintain a stable and competitive exchange rate (Chang et
al. (2013)) this seems unreasonable. Note that assumption 5 does not imply that the impact
effect of FX intervention on the exchange rate is positive. In a simple bivariate context,
assumption 5 is a restriction on the slope of the demand curve. The effect of exogenous FX
intervention depends on the slope of the supply curve.
21I estimate that the conditional monthly standard deviation of the RMB-USD rate was of only 0.4% in
the period subsequent to July 2005. The corresponding amount for free floating currency pairs such as the
Euro-USD and the USD-GBP is of 2.31% and 2.05% respectively.
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1.3.4 Relationship to the literature
The identification strategy employed in this paper is related to two lines of work: (i) the
empirical literature on FX interventions, in particular to the work of Kearns and Rigobon
(2005), (ii) the literature on VARs identified by structural change (Rigobon (2003), Bacchioc-
chi and Fanelli (2012), Bacchiocchi et al. (2014)). In all three instances, structural change
either in the form of a change in intervention probability (Kearns and Rigobon (2005)),
conditional volatility (Rigobon (2003)) or both (Bacchiocchi and Fanelli (2012)) is exploited
to identify the econometric model in question.
In these models, a break in a subset of the structural parameters - e.g. the policy func-
tion parameters - is assumed to rationalize the observed change in the reduced form. My
identification procedure shares this characteristic but differs in that it makes additional
assumptions about the structure of the model. In particular, these assumptions are suf-
ficient to directly identify a subset of the structural parameters of the model unaffected
by the structural change. Knowledge of these structural parameters is then employed to
disentangle the endogenous relationship(s) that characterizes the second policy regime. In
this paper, assumptions 1-3 guarantee that the residual variance of FX interventions in the
fixed exchange rate regime resolves the simultaneity in the managed float regime. These
assumptions, as well as assumption 5, are in addition to the assumption that only a subset
of parameters changes across regimes.
My approach is more restrictive than that of Kearns and Rigobon (2005) and Bacchioc-
chi and Fanelli (2012) since it requires additional identifying assumptions. It has, however,
four distinct advantages vis à vis their approaches in this application. First, my identifying
assumptions may be sufficient, and are in this application, to guarantee global uniqueness
of the solution to the non-linear equation system. Bacchiocchi and Fanelli (2012)’s rank
condition (Proposition 1, pg. 14) instead is necessary and sufficient only for local identifi-
cation. Multiplicity of solutions can, in practice, have a serious impact on inference (e.g.
multiple peaks in the posterior likelihood). Second, my approach only identifies the ef-
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fect of the policy shock, it remains agnostic about the other shocks in the VAR. This is not
the case in Rigobon (2003) and Bacchiocchi and Fanelli (2012) which identify the entire
VAR system. Third, with the macroeconomic time-series data available to us, identifica-
tion methods that rely on structural change typically require large changes in the reduced
forms for the model to be well identified in practice. The policy shift of July 2005 may
not satisfy this condition and my identification strategy, in this instance, may have more
traction on the problem since it effectively relies on a subset of the reduced form estimates
to achieve identification. Obviously, this sharper identification comes at the expense of ad-
ditional assumptions which may or may not be appropriate. Fourth, the simplicity of my
approach is attractive because it gives the identification strategy an intuitive interpretation.
1.4 Estimation and Inference
The reduced form of (1.11) is an unrestricted 3 variable VAR in the log onshore RMB-USD
















where (i) indexes the exchange rate regime and B
(i)
j are the coefficient matrices for each
regime. In the fixed exchange rate period, the first variable in Y
(1)
t , the log of the spot
rate, empirically displays only infinitesimally small variation. Thus only the reduced form
equations involving FX intervention and the trade balance are estimated. The coefficients
and residual variances in these equations are consistently estimated because the omitted
regressor - the USD-RMB rate - has zero variation. In the managed float regime, all equa-
tions in (1.16) are estimated.
I estimate independently both systems of equations using a Bayesian procedure. There
are two source of joint inference I ignore by doing this. The first is that the two samples
in part overlap so that observations from the fixed exchange rate regime are the starting
conditions for the managed float regime. I address this by cutting the samples so that there
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is no overlap in the data. Second, when estimating the covariance matrices independently
it is possible that the model be overidentified. For the model to be true with certainty, joint
inference must be performed. However, even when the covariance matrices are estimated
independently I find that the model is overidentified in a only a trivial amount of draws.
I therefore estimate the two VAR systems separately and discard any draw for which the
model is overidentified. Finally note that given the structure in (1.11) and assumption 1-5,
there is no common inference on the B
(i)
j reduced form parameters that can be made across
regimes.
In both regimes, the system in (1.16) may be equivalently expressed in its simultaneous
equations form:
Y (i) = Z(i)Γ(i) + E(i) (1.17)
I estimate the VARs using a Normal - Inverse Wishart prior:
vec(Γ(i))|Σ(i) ∼ N(vec(Γ(i))|Σ(i) ⊗N−1,(i)) (1.18)
Σ(i) ∼ IWn(v(i)S(i), v(i)) (1.19)
where n indexes the dimension of the reduced form VAR and (Γ(i), S(i), N−1,(i), v(i)) are
hyperparameters governing the prior. These are chosen so that the prior be uninformative
(Uhlig (2005)). The posterior distribution and sampling of the reduced form parameters




ν2 denote the standard deviation of the reduced form residual in the FX inter-
vention equation from the fixed exchange rate regime. To sample this quantity, sample
Σ(1) from the IW posterior of period 1 and extract the appropriate variance term from the
covariance matrix. To identify the model I use the following procedure:




2. I take a draw from the posterior distribution of (Γ(2),Σ(2))
3. For each draw pair, I solve for the parameters as described in section 1.3.2
4. Save the resulting IRF draw (Θ̃) and structural model probability p(Θ̃|Y (2))
Repeating these steps simulates the posterior distribution of the structural parameters. As
shown by Inoue and Kilian (2013), point-wise confidence intervals tend to misrepresent
the shape of the IRFs and have poor nominal coverage. Therefore, I report instead the
posterior mode and the associated credible set22 in my empirical analysis. The posterior
likelihood function of the structural parameters of a SVAR model may be written as:
p(Θ|Y (2)) = |J |p(Γ(2),Σ(2)|Y (2))p(Q|Γ(2),Σ(2)) (1.20)
= |J |p(Γ(2),Σ(2)|Y (2))p(σ(1)ν2 |Σ
(2), Y (1)) (1.21)
where |J | is the appropriate Jacobian matrix. In general, the prior over the rotation matrix
Q is chosen to be flat and independent of the reduced form parameters. However, under
my identifying assumptions, knowledge of σ
(1)
ν2 given Σ
(2) is sufficient to pin down the
rotation matrix Q. Thus the probability of any Q rotation, in fact, depends on the prior
over σ
(1)
ν2 for a given draw of the period 2 reduced form. Under assumptions 1-5, this prior
is the posterior of the fixed exchange rate period FX intervention conditional variance.
The full data sample covers the period between 1998:M1 to 2013:M12, covering exactly
16 years of data or equivalently 192 months. Period 1, the fixed exchange rate regime, in-
cludes 1998:M1 to 2005:M6 for a total of 90 monthly observations. The first reduced form
bivariate VAR in FX interventions and the trade balance is estimated on data from this
period. Period 2, the managed float regime, spans 2005:M7 to 2013:M12 for a total of 102
monthly observations. The second specification is estimated using this data. The start of
the sample is limited by the fact that prior to 1998 balance of payments data is unavail-
able. The data for this paper is obtained from three main sources. The bilateral RMB-USD
rate is obtained from the H.10 release of the Federal Reserve Board. Trade balance data
22For ease of interpretation, the credible set here is formed as the outer contour of the credible set.
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is obtained from the Directions of Trade Statistics (DOTS) dataset of the IMF. Data on FX
holdings and balance of payments is obtained from the PBoC via Haver Analytics.
A last issue regards how to introduce FX interventions and the trade balance in the
econometric specification. This is quite a crucial issue, since the volatility of USD inflows is
assumed to be constant across the sample. Clearly, FX interventions and the trade balance
cannot be measured in either nominal or real USDs as the size the Chinese economy has
radically changed over the sample period. Similarly, the size of shocks measured in USDs
must have also changed. Scaling interventions by GDP is not appropriate either, since the
openness of the Chinese economy has also changed substantially over time. I therefore
normalize FX interventions and the trade balance by the average level of net transactions
with the rest of the world. I measure this as the two-sided 12-month moving average of
the Chinese current account. This deflator well captures the rise and subsequent fall, albeit
to a higher level, in China’s net transactions with the rest of the world.
1.5 Measuring FX intervention
One of the major challenges for researches studying FX intervention policy has been the
reluctance of Central Banks to release detailed information about their activities. In partic-
ular, information on the currency composition and maturity structure of their FX holdings
is rarely known. Though disclosure standards worldwide have been rapidly evolving (see
Adler and Tovar (2011)) and for selected countries these data are now available, measur-
ing policy induced changes in FX reserves remains challenging, especially so in emerging
markets. This distinction between active and passive changes in reserves has been recently
re-emphasized by Dominguez et al. (2012) and Dominguez (2012) in the context of the fi-
nancial crisis.
For the purpose of this paper, I am interested in recovering active changes in FX assets.
This component of reserves is the focus of this paper as it is what researchers typically
associate with FX intervention. Given the lack of direct measures of policy, it has been
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common in the literature to proxy reserve policy by using differences in FX reserve stocks.
However, changes in this measure can be expressed as:
∆FXt = It︸︷︷︸
FX intervention
+ ∆pFXt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Valuation effects
+ rtFXt−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Interest Accrual
(1.22)
so that changes in reserve stocks are a noisy measure of policy as they also include valu-
ation effects and interest accrual. Flow data is a better measure of FX interventions as it
excludes by construction the valuation effect. This valuation effect is, in practice, the real
obstacle to measuring FX intervention precisely. However, discrepancies between flow
and stock data may also infrequently arise due to transfers. In the case of China, the PBoC
has, on occasion, employed FX assets to recapitalize large state-owned financial institu-
tions. Prior to 2007, these recapitalizations occurred through the Central Huijin Investment
Company, the predecessor of China Investment Corporation, with investment capital sup-
plied by the PBoC. A list of these recapitalizations is provided in table 1.2. The list only
includes recapitalizations that were undertaken using FX reserves held by the PBoC23. By
adding back these transfers to the stock of FX holdings of the PBoC I correct for this source
of discrepancy. In practice, the importance of this adjustment is very limited24.
Dominguez et al. (2012) construct their measure of FX interventions by estimating the
valuation and interest accrual components and netting them out from the change in FX
stocks. Interest accrual is estimated using data contained in the SDDS dataset25. The SDDS
dataset is useful to estimate interest accrual as it breaks out FX holdings into deposits and
securities. It does not, however, have any information about the maturity of FX holdings
and, more importantly, about their currency composition. They therefore use aggregate
information available from the Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Re-
serves (COFER) dataset to calibrate the currency portfolios. In this paper I cannot follow
this approach for two reasons: (i) China does not participate in the SDDS initiative, (ii)
23For more details see Zhang (2010).
24With the exception of one data point there is no substantial difference in the estimated latent factor. The
data point in question is that associated with the recapitalization undertaken in December 2003
25The SDDS is one of IMF’s Data Dissemination Standards initiatives to which countries participate is on a
voluntary basis
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even for countries in the SDDS, data is only available from around the mid 2000s so that
the resulting time-series are short.
The approach taken in this paper is to model FX intervention as a latent variable of
which I observe two signals. This problem can therefore be cast into a state space form
and I use the Kalman filter to produce an optimal online forecast of the latent state. The
measure equations of this system may be written as:
∆FXt = rtFXt−1 + It +∆
pFXt (1.23)
FXBOPt = rtFXt−1 + It (1.24)
where ∆FXt is the change in the stock of FX reserves, FXBOPt is the flow of FX reserves
observed in the balance of payments statistics and t indexes months. The first variable is
observed on a monthly basis while the latter is observed at a quarterly frequency. Ignoring
the interest accrual term, the filtering procedure I employ will attribute the total amount
of FX intervention in a quarter measured by FXBOPt to the months within that quarter
based on the noisy monthly information that is contained in ∆FXt. This information is
noisy because changes in ∆FXt in any month may be due to valuation effects rather than
FX intervention. Intuitively, the more precisely the valuation effect is approximated, the
more precise will be the inference around the latent factor.
Since FX reserves are typically held in a small set of foreign currencies26, valuation
effects will depend on exchange rate fluctuations between reserve currencies and the USD.






tFXt−1 + νt (1.25)
where C is the set of reserve currencies other than the dollar, FXt−1 is the stock of FX as-
26According to the COFER data the bulk of FX reserves in EMs is held in only 4 currencies: USD (64.9%),
Euros (26%), GBP (4.4%) and Yen (2.1%).
27The exchange rate here is quoted as Dollars/LCU so that an increase is an appreciation of the LCU relative
to the Dollar which implies that all else equal the dollar value of FX has increased.
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sets and βit is the value share of FX reserves in currency i
28. Since the currency weights may
vary over the sample, I employ information from the literature to calibrate priors for the
value shares. In particular, Sheng (2013) finds evidence that except for the euro share all
other currency weights do not fluctuate significantly over the period 1999-2007. I use this
information to calibrate an informative prior for the βit value shares. Details on the prior
calibration and reserve currencies used to model the valuation effect are listed in table 1.1.
In particular, I set all coefficients minus the euro share to be constant around Sheng’s esti-
mates. I model the break in the value share of the Euro to occur in September 2002. This
is the month identified by Sheng to exhibit the portfolio shift. One caveat to my analy-
sis is that Sheng’s study only covers the period between 1999 to the end of 2007 so that if
other portfolio shifts occur in the sample, my model will not be able to accommodate them.
In my empirical implementation, I define (It + rtFXt−1) to be the latent factor in my
model rather than It directly. I do this because, differently than the valuation effect, my
measures of FX intervention do not allow for clean separation of the interest accrual term
from It even when aggregated at the quarterly level
29. To identify It, I subtract my estimate
of interest accrual from the latent factor. I proxy interest rates with the 10-year government
bond yields as in Dominguez et al. (2012). Since the effective maturity of holdings is, in
fact, unknown this might result in an imperfect approximation of the interest accrual term.
In practice, accrued interest plays no significant role in determining the resulting time-
series due to the scale of FX intervention in China.
The model has three sets of parameters: |C| currency shares, the variance parameters
and the state equation autoregressive parameter(s)30. The currency weight priors are cho-
sen to be informative as described above. The priors for the variance and AR parameters
are chosen to be uninformative. All priors are chosen to be conjugate in nature. The model
is estimated using standard Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods described by
28For a similar approach to this problem see Sheng (2013).
29The valuation effect instead is identified at the quarterly frequency as, by definition, it is the difference
between FXBOPt and
∑t
s=t−2 ∆FXs in the months t in which FXBOPt is observed.
30In this instance, the loading parameters are known and thus the variance parameters are separately iden-
tified. In general, this is not the case in a dynamic factor model.
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Carter and Kohn (1994). I estimate the model using 5,000 burn in draws. I then save
the following 10,000 draws to compute posterior means and standard deviations of the
latent factor and parameters. In figure 1.2, I have plotted the estimated FX intervention
time-series in blue and the associated standard errors in red. In green I have also plotted
the changes in FX stocks. In parallel to the expansion of Chinese trade, FX intervention
steadily rises from the start of the sample till the start of financial crisis. It remains lower
in the subsequent period and recovers to levels similar to those of 2006/2007 by the end
of the sample. The posterior estimates of the currency shares are also reported in table 1.1.
These suggest that about 64.9% of Chinese FX assets are dollar denominated. The figure on
the USD share is roughly in line with other estimates in the literature (55% - 65%, Prasad
and Wei (2005)).
1.6 Empirical Results
Prior to estimation of (1.16), I use an information criterion to determine the number of lags
to include. I do this separately for each exchange rate regime. I choose to specify both
models with 3 lags. This is the maximum number of lags selected by any of the three in-
formation criteria used (AIC, HQIC, BIC) across the two regimes. I also do not choose to
model (1.16) with a lower lag length because, by construction, the FX intervention variable
features a form of smoothing of lag length 3. In fact, when I estimate the FX intervention
variable, I assume that FX interventions measured from the stock data align with those
measured from the balance of payments flow data. This effectively induces the Kalman
Filter to smooth the within quarter variables so that they are consistent with the quarterly
frequency observations.
I approximate the posterior distribution of the structural parameters by taking 500
draws of Σ(1), independently of (Γ(2),Σ(2)), and 2,000 draws of (Γ(2),Σ(2)). The posterior
distribution of the parameters is therefore approximated by about 1,000,000 draws. The
IRFs I have reported are limited, by choice, to the first 24 months after the impact period.
With only 3 lags in the VAR specification and 102 monthly observations to estimate it, it
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is unlikely that inference from my model is reliable beyond the 1 to 2 year horizon. Given
the sample size, including more lags is unlikely to solve this problem.
In figure 1.3, left column, I have plotted the estimated IRF of the onshore spot rate, FX
interventions and the trade balance to an exogenous purchase of FX by the PBoC. In the
right column of figure 1.3, I have plotted the corresponding variance decompositions. In
blue I have plotted the modal response, and in two shades of red, respectively, the 68%
and 90% confidence intervals. The size of the policy shock is normalized to induce a 1%
depreciation in the onshore RMB-USD rate on impact. Thus the impact coefficient in the
FX intervention IRF - .5941 - quantifies the size of the FX purchase made by the PBoC.
Since, FX interventions in the model are measured as the ratio between FX interventions
and the 12-month moving average of the current account, the size of such impact can only
be measured at the mean of the scaling factor. I find that to induce a 1% depreciation of the
spot rate, the PBoC must make purchases of 24.2 Bln USD and this purchase is statistically
very different from zero. In fact, more than 99% of the posterior distribution for the impact
effect lies above the zero. A purchase of 24.2 Bln USD within a month may seem extremely
large but this in part depends on the fact that in the RMB-USD bilateral rate a 1% move-
ment is indeed a very large shock. The standard deviation of the residuals from the first
equation of the VAR - the exchange rate equation - is of 0.4%. Thus a 1% depreciation is
more than a two standard deviation size change in the onshore rate.
Beyond the mode and the impact effects, we can observe that the confidence intervals
around FX intervention narrow substantially after about 12 months from the initial shock.
My estimates suggest that FX intervention falls to zero between 6 to 12 months after the
initial policy shock. Thus, even though my model allows only for short-run inference,
we have some confidence that policy induced FX purchases are short-lived. On the other
hand, the effects of the policy shock on the exchange rate are very long lasting. FX inter-
vention depreciates the onshore spot rate on impact and this depreciation persists for at
least 2 years after the shock at the 68% confidence level. These confidence intervals for
the exchange rate response, however, are extremely wide, especially upwards, and do not
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exclude continued depreciations that peak at 3.5/4% at the 15-20 month horizon after the
initial shock. At the mode, the RMB-USD rate continues to depreciate for the first 10-12
months after the initial shock. This suggests that the effect of FX interventions persists
even after these have ceased to continue.
Finally in the lowest panel of figure 1.3, I have plotted the IRF of the trade balance. I
find that an exogenous purchase of 24.2 Bln USD has on impact a, statistically insignificant,
negative effect in the order of -97.2 Mln USDs. Equivalently, for every 1 USD of FX inter-
vention the trade balance deteriorates by less than 1 cent (0.01 USD). In the 68% highest
likelihood set the model with the highest impact effect estimates that the trade balance im-
proves only by ten cents (0.1 USD) for every dollar of FX intervention. Beyond the impact
effect, the trade balance shows a small dip which is reversed within the first few months.
The two opposing effects roughly cancel each other out. However, after this dynamic re-
sponse, the IRF remains near zero for the remainder of the inference horizon. In sum, over
the short-medium run the effect of such purchases on the trade balance is statistically in-
significant and economically small. Another metric of the importance of FX intervention
shocks for the trade balance can be garnered by looking at the variance decomposition. At
the mode, the shock explains less than 5% of the variation in the trade balance. In the 90%
highest likelihood set, the shock can explain at most 10% on impact and 20% over the other
horizons of the total variation in the trade balance. While my model cannot sign the effect,
it suggests that the quantitative relevance of this channel is rather marginal.
1.6.1 Robustness checks
The financial crisis
As discussed in section 1.2.2, a feature of the data that stands out from the managed float
regime is the behavior of the RMB-USD rate between October 2008 and May 2010. In this
period, the PBoC returned to peg the currency against the USD in response to the events
of the financial crisis and the steep fall in global trade. There is a worry that the differing
behavior of the exchange rate in this period is a result of a change in policy by the PBoC.
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For this reason, I exclude the period between October 2008 and June 2010 from the man-
aged float regime and re-estimate my model with this restricted sample.
The results are plotted in figure 1.4. The impact effect of the policy shock, however,
remains practically unchanged. The USD purchases required to induce a 1% depreciation
remain constant though the confidence interval widens a bit, especially downwards. This,
however, is probably due to the fact that excluding the October 2008 to June 2010 period
from the managed float period reduces my sample by about one third (102 observations
to 76 observations). Thus, the precision of the estimate of the reduced falls. The dynam-
ics of the FX intervention response and the spot rate, on the other hand, differ a little. At
the mode, after 6 months of positive interventions the PBoC begins to sell FX assets and
shortly thereafter the exchange rate begins to slowly appreciate. However, this apprecia-
tion is slow and the exchange rate remains depreciated for 2 years following the shock just
as above.
The impact effect on the trade balance remains small - -1.71 Bln USD - especially when
compared to the FX purchase of 24.2 Bln USD, though it is significantly bigger than the
baseline. The estimates also suggest that the positive movement in the trade balance in
the first few months is now statistically significant though extremely transitory, lasting 2
months at most. Once again, six months after the initial shock the effects on the trade
balance are only very marginal. Looking at the variance decomposition across the two
estimates also suggests that the impact of FX intervention on the trade balance is compa-
rable. At the modal response it explains slightly less than 10% of the total variance in the
trade balance across the entire inference horizon. As before, in the 90% highest likelihood
set, the shock can explain at most 20% of the total variation in the trade balance.
A diffuse prior
A concern with any model identified exploiting structural change is that the change in the
parameters is not limited to the subset of parameters a priori identified by the researcher.
In my identification procedure, I assume that the variation in FX intervention attributable
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to fundamental shocks other than the policy shock - denoted with g(•) - is constant across
exchange rate regimes. As discussed in section 1.3.3, there are reasons both in favour and
against this parameter remaining constant. I therefore proceed to show that the fundamen-
tal inference that is made by my model does not differ much when introducing additional
uncertainty around the value of g(•).
I relax assumption 4 in the following way. Let g(1)(•) be the variation in FX inter-
vention in the fixed exchange rate regime and g(2)(•) that in the managed float period.
Since both functions are scalar valued, there is no loss of generality by expressing their
relationship as: g(2)(•) = ςg(1)(•). Since, g(1)(•) is measured in the data, I can express my
uncertainty over g(2)(•) by letting ς be a random variable. The choice of prior (e.g. Uni-
form, Beta, etc) for ς could be justified by the researcher’s prior over the likelihood of a
large or small change in g(i)(•) across periods. In this application, I work with a uniform
distribution so that ς ∼ U [ς, ς].
The primary concern in this paper is that an increase in the exchange rate flexibility
induces an increase in speculative activity on the currency. I therefore assume that ς = 1,
reflecting that the concern is around an increase of the USD inflow volatility, not a de-
crease. The choice of the upper bound is more arbitrary. In the results I present I set it to
ς = 5. Thus, I allow the g(2)(•) parameter to increase by up to 5 times, at any point of the
posterior distribution. I rescale the entire posterior distribution of g(1)(•) by this factor, not
only the mean. In practice, I do this by taking a draw from the posterior distribution for
g(1)(•) and a draw from my prior over ς . Multiplying the two random variables we obtain
a draw for g(2)(•).
The results are plotted in figure 1.5. The first, obvious, effect of relaxing assumption
4 is that the uncertainty around the IRFs increases substantially. Note, however, that the
modal response of all three variables is highly comparable to the baseline. The estimates
in the middle panel suggest that the PBoC may need to purchase - at the upper bound
- 80 Bln USD to induce a 1% depreciation versus 24.2 Bln in the baseline estimates. The
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effect of these purchases on the trade balance, though very comparable at the mode, is far
more uncertain in USD terms since the confidence interval around the IRF in the first year
widens significantly. However, also the average intervention size increases significantly.
The variance decomposition still suggests that the explanatory power of the policy shocks
for the total variation in the trade balance is small and the upper bound is consistent with
the other two estimates.
1.7 Support for the identifying assumptions
In this section, I provide indirect evidence in favour of the identification scheme employed
in my structural VAR analysis. I show that the IRF of the bilateral USD-RMB spot rate to
the policy shock I have identified is consistent with IRF function identified using policy
shocks identified at high-frequency.
1.7.1 Identification of the policy shocks
Martin (2013) identifies a set of 23 announcements referencing news regarding Chinese
exchange rate policy and/or Chinese U.S. Treasury purchases. This set of events has two
desirable properties that make identification of the policy shock relatively clean. The first
property is that the set of events is selected using an exogenous rule to avoid sample selec-
tion. These events are collected either from announcements posted on the PBoC’s website
or by keyword search of news announcements published on the Wall Street Journal. For any
event to be included in the final 23 a precise measure of the announcement time must also
be included. The events are not restricted in any other way. Second these announcements
are chosen to be explicitly exogenous and specific. They are specific because they are an-
nouncements about Chinese policy intentions made only by government officials. They
are exogenous because they contain information about future policy and nothing else.
This last requirement is crucial. Identification based on high-frequency assumes that
the change induced in the spot and forward rates in the event window must arise only
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from the change in the expected policy shock31. When this is not the case, identification
fails. For example, if the announcement also releases information about other shocks hit-
ting the economy then the change in the conditional expectation of the spot and forwards
will vary both because of the announcement and because of the additional information
released with the announcement. Thus the estimated coefficient from the surprises will
conflate the two effects. The second requirement for identification is that the risk premium
on the forward not change in the event window in response to the shock. In the sample
period under analysis, the RMB-USD presents a statistically significant forward premium.
This does not per se invalidate the inference so long as this premium is constant in the event
window.
Though the set of events is carefully selected using the criteria described above, sam-
ple selection may be still a concern. In fact, differently from the FOMC meetings which
follow a pre-established calendar, the set of announcements identified by Martin (2013) is
set of instances in which PBoC authorities chose to divulge information. In the literature
on FX interventions, there is some evidence that announced FX interventions are more ef-
fective at guiding the exchange rate than unannounced interventions (Fratzscher (2006)).
These results are however based on countries with a free floating exchange rate. Nonethe-
less, it is possible that the economic shocks that are being compared in this analysis are
different. Note, however that if the shocks were in fact different then this would suggest
that the IRFs should differ.
Lastly, the set of events spans between July 21, 2005 and September 30, 2011. Prior to
the end of fixed peg to the dollar there are no relevant announcements as Chinese officials
never made any policy announcement regarding their exchange rate or foreign exchange
policy.
31For more details see Section 3 of Faust et al. (2004).
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1.7.2 Data on Non-Deliverable Forwards
In line with the literature, I use the change in basis points in the forwards to measure the
change in the market’s conditional expectations of the future exchange rate around the
policy announcement. The peculiarity of China is that these over-the-counter forwards are
traded offshore and are non-deliverable since the RMB is not convertible under the capital
account. Even though these contracts are traded offshore, the underlying reference asset is
the onshore RMB-USD spot rate. From Bloomberg, I obtain onshore spot and NDF end of
day prices for the following maturities: 1M, 2M, 3M, 6M, 9M and 12M.
In the high-frequency literature, policy surprises are typically measured in short 30
minute to 2 hours windows using intradaily data to ensure clean identification of the policy
shock. One of the limitations of the forwards data available from Bloomberg is that it is
available only at daily frequency32. I, in part, circumvent this problem by exploiting the
fact that Bloomberg reports in fact three different end of day prices. It reports the market33
close price of the NDFs at the close of the Tokyo, London and the New York stock markets.
These contracts are not traded in these venues; the closing times are just used for time
reference purpose. Due to the different closing times (in local time) and the time zone
difference between these three cities it is possible to construct surprise windows that are
strictly smaller than the 24 hour windows between the NY close price pre-event and the
NY close price post-event. Most events occur between the close of the NY stock exchange
and the close of the Tokyo stock exchange reducing to about 13 hours the time between
pre and post event prices.
1.7.3 Outlier analysis and results
Figure 1.6 graphs the scatter plots between the spot rate change and the change in the vari-
ous forward contracts measured in basis points. As is easy to see, the sample is dominated
32It is available intradaily for the last 180 days. However, the intradaily quotes are bank specific rather than
market quotes.
33NDF are traded over the counter by a number of financial institutions. Bloomberg uses an algorithm to
aggregate individual quotes to form the market quote using a cutoff algorithm for quotes that have become
stale.
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by a large outlier that occurs on July 21st 2005 - the day of the policy change. Standard re-
gression methods are well known to be heavily influenced by such outliers. As a first step
then, I employ a robust regression method to identify the weight given to this observation
by this procedure. Robust regression methods are a form of weighted regression, where
the weights are chosen to guard against possible outliers and model misspecification.
I find that the robust regression assigns a weight of zero to that observation across all
NDF maturities. This suggests that a robust estimate of the IRF should exclude the policy
surprise that occurred on July 21st 2005. This is perhaps not surprising as in this particular
policy surprise are embedded two pieces of news: (i) the change in regime - the announce-
ment of a shift to a managed float, rather than a revaluation to another fixed peg, (ii) the
policy surprise - the amount of revaluation in the bilateral rate. The second component
is common with the rest of the sample but the first is not. For this reason I exclude this
observation from the sample.
In table 1.3 I have reported the OLS estimates of the spot rate change on the change
in different maturities of the forwards excluding the first observation. I wish to compare
these estimates to those implied by my structural VAR and test that the predictions of the
two models are consistent. From visual inspection of figure 1.3, one can see that the IRF
identified at high-frequency - the dotted black line - does not differ very strongly from
that identified in the structural VAR - the dark blue line. More formally, I carry out this
test using a Wald test, with the null hypothesis that βHF − βSV AR = 034. For this test to
be correct, the asymptotic distribution of both the OLS estimates and the Bayesian VAR
coefficients must be asymptotically normal. If both are normally distributed vectors, then
the difference in the coefficients will still be normally distributed. Further, the variance-
covariance matrix will simply be the sum of the two variance-covariance matrices. With
6 maturities of NDF, the test statistic will asymptotically follow a Chi-square distribution
with 6 degrees of freedom. The Wald statistic has a value of 6.503, which implies that the
34Strictly speaking the test is ill defined. I improperly interpret the Bayesian posterior likelihood as a fre-
quentist confidence interval when I conduct the Wald test.
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null cannot be rejected at any standard confidence level35. This is unsurprising as inspec-
tion of figure 1.3 reveals that the two IRF estimates almost perfectly overlay each other.
Thus eventough the power of the test is low, the almost identical point estimates suggest
that the models do in fact give similar predictions in terms of the USD-RMB response to a
policy shock.
1.8 Conclusion
In this paper, I have documented how under assumptions 1-5 it is possible to identify ex-
ogenous policy shocks in the form of FX intervention by the PBoC. To my knowledge, the
identification scheme is a novel application of established identification methods (Kearns
and Rigobon (2005), Bacchiocchi and Fanelli (2012)). I use these identified policy shocks to
study the effect of FX intervention on the onshore RMB-USD spot and the trade balance.
I find that purchases of FX assets depreciate the exchange rate and this effect is long last-
ing (1-2 years), especially when compared to the impact of FX intervention in countries
with a free floating exchange rate regime. However, the scale of FX intervention the PBoC
must undertake to affect the exchange rate is extremely large suggesting that the onshore
USD supply is, in fact, rather elastic. Further, I show that these same FX shocks have eco-
nomically small and statistically insignificant effects on the trade balance. At the mode,
for every 1 USD of FX intervention the trade balance deteriorates by less than 1 cent (0.01
USD). In the 68% highest likelihood set the model with the highest impact effect estimates
that the trade balance improves only by ten cents (0.1 USD) for every dollar of FX inter-
vention. In the set of likely models, this estimate is the estimate which is most favourable
to the neo-mercantilistic hypothesis. Nonetheless, even in this case, I find that the effect is
small. Over longer horizons, I find that the per dollar effect of FX intervention on the trade
balance does not differ much from the above estimates. When I relax the assumption that
the variance of non-policy shocks be constant across regimes, I once again find evidence
that this effect is at the mode near zero and in the most favourable model it remains small.
Overall, my estimates suggest that FX intervention doesn’t affect the trade balance, and if
35The relevant threshold values are 10.64, 12.53, 16.81 to reject the null at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respec-
tively.
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it does this effect is small. Finally, I employ the policy shocks identified by Martin (2013)
to provide indirect evidence of my model’s predictions. I find that the IRF of the bilateral
RMB-USD rate identified by his policy shocks is consistent with the IRF of my structural
VAR. Though this does not constitute a formal test of my model’s identifying assumptions,




From the system in (1.11), the reduced form 2 × 2 covariance matrix, ΣS , may be derived

































































































































































































1g(•) h(•)σ2D + α1g(•)
h(•)σ2D + α1g(•) (h(•))2σ2D + g(•)

 (1.44)
which follows from (1.36), (1.39) and (1.42).









1g(•) h(•)σ2D + α1g(•)











since α1 = 0 and σD = 0. Thus the variance of FX intervention directly identifies g(•).
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Figures
Figure 1.1: RMB-USD exchange rate regimes
In blue, I have plotted the time-series of the onshore RMB-USD rate measured on the last
day of each month. Sample begins in January 1998 and ends in December 2013. The fixed
exchange rate period spans the period January 1998 to June 2005. The managed float
regime spans the period July 2005 to December 2013. The vertical red line separates the
fixed exchange rate regime from the managed float period. Between October 2008 and
June 2010, the PBoC effectively re-pegs the exchange rate to the USD. The period in
question is highlighted by the two vertical black lines.







Bilateral onshore RMB−USD rate
Managed float period
Fixed exchange rate period
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Figure 1.2: Estimate of FX intervention time-series
The figure plots the estimated latent process It (in dark blue) along with the 68% standard
errors bands (in red). The time-series measures in USD Billions the purchases of FX assets
by the PBoC. The measure of It is the output of a mixed frequency Kalman filtering
procedure. The mean and standard deviation of the latent state are based on 10,000 draws
from the posterior distribution. The monthly signal, given by the change in FX stocks
(∆FXt), is plotted in green. The quarterly signal, given by the flow of FX reserves
(FXBOPt), is absent from the plot.
































Figure 1.3: Impulse Reponse Functions: Baseline results
The figure plots the IRFs of the RMB-USD rate, FX intervention and trade balance in
response to a policy shock. The responses trace the response of each variable to a policy
shock in the managed float regime. The policy shock is normalized to induce a 1%
depreciation of the RMB-USD spot. The bold blue lines are the modal model. The dotted
light (dark) red line is the outer contour of the 68% (90%) confidence intervals.



































































































Figure 1.4: Impulse Reponse Functions: Excluding October 2008-July 2010
The figure plots the IRFs of the RMB-USD rate, FX intervention and trade balance in
response to a policy shock. The responses trace the response of each variable to a policy
shock in the managed float regime. In this computation, the period between October 2008
and July 2010 is excluded from the managed float sample. The policy shock is normalized
to induce a 1% depreciation of the RMB-USD spot. The bold blue lines are the modal
model. The dotted light (dark) red line is the outer contour of the 68% (90%) confidence
intervals.
































































































































Figure 1.5: Impulse Reponse Functions: Diffuse prior
The figure plots the IRFs of the RMB-USD rate, FX intervention and trade balance in
response to a policy shock. The responses trace the response of each variable to a policy
shock in the managed float regime. In this computation, assumption 2 is relaxed. It is
assumed that the period 2 value of the variance - g(ΦNP ) - may take any value equal to or
up to five times larger than the period 1 estimate. Once again, the policy shock is
normalized to induce a 1% depreciation of the RMB-USD spot. The bold blue lines are the
modal model. The dotted light (dark) red line is the outer contour of the 68% (90%)
confidence intervals.































































































































Figure 1.6: Changes in the spot and forward RMB-USD rates in the event windows
The figure displays the scatter plots of the change in the RMB-USD spot rate against the
change in the Non-Deliverable Forward (NDF) rate in basis points in the policy surprise
windows identified by Martin (2013). The suprise occuring on July 21st, 2005 is labelled
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Tables
Table 1.1: Priors and Posteriors for currency shares
The table lists priors (left panel) and posteriors (right panel) for the various value shares
of the currencies used to model the valuation effect (see (1.25)). Priors are based on the
work of Sheng (2013). Posterior mean and standard deviation are based on 10,000 draws
from the posterior distribution of the currency shares after an initial burn-in of 5,000
draws.
Priors Posteriors
Coef Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
βEuro1 5% 1% 5.8% 1.2%
βEuro2 23% 2% 24.6% 2.3%
βY en 2.7% 1% 4.2% 1.1%
βAUD 3% 1% 1.7% 1%
βGBP 3% 1% 4.6% 0.8%
Table 1.2: Recapitalizations undertaken by the PBOC
The table lists recapitalizations undertaken by the PBoC using FX assets under control of
the State Administration for Foreign Assets (SAFE). The table is based on data collected
by Zhang (2010), Table 1 pg. 39.
Institution Date Bn (USD)
Bank of China Dec 2003 22.5
China Construction Bank Dec 2003 20
Jianyin Investment Company Dec 2003 2.5
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China April 2005 15
China reinsurance (group) Co. April 2007 2
National Development Bank Dec 2007 20
Agricultural Bank of China Oct 2008 19
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Table 1.3: High-Frequency based estimates of RMB-USD IRF
The table lists the point estimates and standard errors of the 6 separate univariate
regressions of the spot rate change against the change in one of the 6 forward maturities
in the surprise window. These estimates exclude from the sample the first policy surprise
of July 21st, 2005 for the reasons discussed in the paper.
SPOT 1M NDF 2M NDF 3M NDF 6M NDF 9M NDF 12M NDF
β 1.001*** 1.205*** 1.332*** 1.618*** 1.780*** 2.057***
σβ (0.154) (0.208) (0.219) (0.260) (0.334) (0.409)
Observations 22 22 22 22 22 22
R-squared 0.679 0.627 0.650 0.659 0.587 0.558
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CHAPTER 2
Gross Bank Credit Flows: Evidence from the unit banking system in
the state of New York, 1912-1932 - with Haelim Park
2.1 Introduction
In recent years, a number of papers have documented interesting and independent dy-
namics of gross bank credit flows that underlie net bank credit flows. In fact, aggregate
changes in net credit almost always mask the considerable heterogeneity in changes in
bank credit across banks. Scholars have measured this heterogeneity in terms of gross
creation and destruction of credit and the rate at which credit is reallocated across banks
above and beyond the net change. This excess credit reallocation is considered a proxy of
credit market frictions as it provides a measure of the additional reallocation of credit that
must occur to accommodate changes in net credit.
Several empirical papers have shown that large gross credit flows exist in the U.S.
banking system. In particular, Dell’Arriccia and Garibaldi (2005), Craig and Haubrich
(2013), and Contessi and Francis (2010) construct measures of gross credit flows using the
Call Reports for the U.S. banking system. They find that credit creation and destruction
coexist over the business cycle and that excess credit reallocation is countercyclical as a
result of a decline in the creation margin and a rise in the destruction margin during reces-
sions. A related literature studies credit reallocation across non-financial firms. Herrera et
al. (2011) construct such measures using firm-level financial data from the U.S. Compustat
tapes and documents. They conclude that excess credit reallocation is pro-cyclical due to a
rapid decline in the creation margin with a moderate rise in the destruction margin.
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Our empirical work is an extension of this line of research. In particular, we docu-
ment stylized facts about gross bank credit flows in New York State between 1912 and
1932. To do so, we construct a bank level dataset from the reports of the superintendents
of the banking department, which included all state-chartered banks and trust companies.
This dataset presents two majors advantages. First, the dataset is composed mostly of unit
banks1. This helps alleviate aggregation bias that arises in modern data since a unit bank
serves the local market and does not have any connecting banks (i.e. branches) in other
areas. Second, this dataset is characterized by loan categories that are structured in func-
tion of the collateral that secures the loan. This allows us to study how the creation and
destruction margins vary in function of the underlying collateral of a loan.
In line with the literature, we find that credit creation and destruction coexist across
the business cycle. However, we find that mean levels of creation, destruction and excess
reallocation are higher than those previously documented. In particular, we find that ex-
cess reallocation of credit per quarter is in the order of 4.71%, rather than 2.6%. Thus, the
heterogeneity in behaviour and the potential cost of credit frictions is almost twice that
previously estimated. We also find that excess reallocation is strongly pro-cyclical, rather
than countercyclical as documented by the literature. We suggest that this may be due to
differences in the cyclical behaviour of bank deposit flows across the business cycle before
and after the institution of deposit insurance (Pennacchi (2006)).
In addition, we document how the behaviour of gross credit flows varies in function of
the type of collateral underlying the loan. In particular, we show that collateralized loans
1The unit structure of the banking system in the U.S. contributed to inefficient allocation of credit. The unit
banking system created barriers to entry, which prevented productive competition amongst banks, especially
in rural areas. In addition, it produced lack of diversification of loan risk within banks as each bank’s portfolio
risk reflected the operations of its local economy. In agricultural areas, the income of banks was closely tied to
changes in the prices and harvests of one or two crops. The unit banking structure hindered financial integra-
tion across regions, which resulted in large differences in interest rates across regions since banks can easily
move funds across regions to accommodate differences in demand. Lastly, unit banking caused a growing
mismatch between the supply and demand of credit. Small banks could not lend the sums needed by large
industrial firms. When the scale of industry grew substantially in the nineteenth century, banks could not
keep up with its demand. As a result, industries replaced bank loans with other means of financing by the
end of the nineteenth century.
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are pro-cyclical in the creation margin, but acyclical in the destruction margin. On the other
hand, uncollateralized loans are acyclical in creation but countercyclical in destruction. As
well, we find that creation is relatively more volatile than destruction for collateralized
loans, while the opposite is true for uncollateralized loans. These results suggest that col-
lateral reduces the informational asymmetry between borrowers and lenders making the
creation margin more volatile and responsive to business cycle fluctuations than it would
otherwise be. However, rather than attenuating the asymmetry between credit creation
and destruction, collateral reverses this asymmetry. A mechanism by which collateral aids
the formation of credit relationships but impedes their separation rationalizes our empiri-
cal results.
Our paper improves upon earlier studies in three main dimensions. First, our study
provides more accurate measures of gross credit creation and destruction. This occurs due
to the unit banking structure we study. In fact, since loan creation and destruction may
not be contemporaneously observed within the smallest unit of observation, aggregation
seriously affects our ability to measure such heterogeneity within a banking conglomer-
ate. Second, we contribute to the literature by examining the role of collateral. A num-
ber of studies find that collateral reduces informational asymmetries (Bester (1987)), by
reducing credit risk and moral hazard, thus increasing the ease with banks may expand
credit. Specifically, we study the properties of gross credit flows in function of the collat-
eral underlying the loans. This is particularly of interest because the asymmetry between
the gross creation and destruction margins in this literature arises because the creation of
loans is subjects to information frictions but the destruction process is not (Dell’Arriccia
and Garibaldi (1998)). Third, the unit banking structure is advantageous because banking
activities are extremely local. This allows us to identify regional shocks far more precisely.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the data we employ.
Section 2.3 describes the methodology. Section 2.4 describes stylized facts about gross
credit flows in the state of New York. Section 2.5 concludes.
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2.2 Data
To characterize aggregate gross credit flows we require two distinct types of information.
First, we require information on loans outstanding at the bank level. Second, to appropri-
ately characterize the cross-section of changes in credit, we must properly account for any
merger activity. We discuss each dataset in turn.
We collect and computerize bank level balance sheets from the annual report of the
superintendent of the banking department of the state of New York. These annual reports
published balance sheet information for all state chartered banks and trust companies in
the state of New York. Data on nationally chartered banks, however, are not included in
this report2. The report underwent major changes in 1911 and in 1939. In 1911, it started
publishing balance sheet information of trust companies at the quarterly frequency3. In
1939, the annual report began to publish balance sheet categories that were inconsistent
with those of previous reports. In addition, the publication of balance sheet statements
was discontinued between 1933 and 1934. Given the limitations of the data, we restrict our
sample period to 1912-1932. In this period, reporting was done on a quarterly basis, the
structure of balance sheets is comparable across time and there are no gaps in the time-
series of surviving banks.
Figure 2.1 displays the balance sheet categories of a state commercial bank in this pe-
riod. For this study, we focus on four types of asset categories that represent credit. The
first category is mortgages owned, which are loans on secured real estate4. Banks were al-
lowed to make mortgage loans on farmland within one hundred miles of the city, though
these mortgage loans were accompanied by several restrictions. The second category is
loans and discounts secured by bond and mortgage, deed and other real estate collateral.
2As well, data on nationally chartered banks is not included in our dataset. This is because there is a large
discrepancy between reports for state banks and national banks. The OCC reported balance sheets for national
banks once a year and provided different asset categories.
3Prior to this change, these balance sheets were published at yearly frequency. This change in regulation
originated in the desire to regulate trust companies which had been responsible for causing the panic of 1907.
4National banks were prevented from making mortgage loans until the passage of the Federal Reserve Act.
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However, a deed was taken as a mortgage, but not an absolute transfer of ownership.
Moreover, well-managed banks avoided deeds. The third category is loans and discounts
secured by other collateral. These are loans secured by anything except for real estate se-
curity, Liberty Bonds, stocks and bonds listed on the stock exchanges, and unlisted securi-
ties. The fourth category is loans, discounts, and bills purchased not secured by collateral.
These are loans represented by promissory notes.
We also collect information on entry, exit, mergers, and changes in charter status of
state chartered financial institutions5. While previous studies were concerned with spuri-
ous gross credit flows due to merger activities, they were not as concerned about the entry
and exit of banks. In contrast, our study may suffer from spurious gross credit flows due to
the entry and exit of banks in addition to merger activities. Due to the absence of national
banks in our dataset, we cannot presume that entering (exiting) banks are new (closing)
banks. This is because new banks appear in our dataset when nationally chartered banks
enter (exit) our sample by switching their charters or by merging with a state chartered
bank. We discuss how we deal with this issue in section 2.3 and its effect on our estimates
of aggregate credit flows.
New York is an ideal state to study gross credit flows for two reasons. First, the state
represented a large share of total loans in the United States. During our sample period,
national and state chartered banks in New York held an average of over 21 percent of all
loans in the United States. In addition, state chartered banks played an important role in
the state banking industry for they represented about 60 percent of total loans in New York
State. Second, New York State established a banking system with a great diversity. New
York’s banking industry was made up of banks of all sizes and types, from large money
centers and global banks in New York City, to medium-sized banks with active manufac-
turing and industrial bases, to small banks in rural areas.
5The annual report publishes merger, charter switch, name change, and exit dates for of all state banks and
trusts which it oversees. Establishment dates for each bank are instead collected from Rand-McNally Banker’s
directory.
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There are a number of important features of the sample we study. First, we analyze a
period that is characterized by a prolonged lending boom (1920s) and a subsequent severe
bust. This was reflected in a concurrent expansion of both the number of banks and loans
outstanding in the period 1912-1929 and their contraction in the bust period following
1929. Relative to the number of banks, total banking assets grew far more rapidly. In
fact, outstanding loans increased almost six-fold between 1912 and 1929. This run up in
credit, however, was quickly reversed as can be seen in table 2.1. This credit boom was
roughly similar in magnitude both in New York City and the New York State. However, in
New York City the ramp up and the fall were both sharper. Second, in our sample there is
substantial inequality in the size of the loan book as measured by the Gini index. However,
both small and big banks experienced credit expansion in the 1920s as the Gini index did
not increase very rapidly between 1912 and 1929. Third, the average level of banking
concentration in our sample is very low. This is in large part due to the unit banking
structure of the financial system. In fact, especially outside of New York City, banks were
very small and extremely tied to the local market6. Across time, we observe that the fall in
the number of banks is accompanied by an increase in banking concentration following the
1929 bust. In fact, the bust triggered a number of mergers that consolidated the banking
sector. This consolidation wave was particularly strong in New York City.
2.3 Methodology
Following Dell’Arriccia and Garibaldi (2005) and Craig and Haubrich (2013), we decom-
pose net credit growth into gross credit creation and gross credit destruction. This ap-
proach faces five main methodological issues. First, it may underestimate gross flows since
we do not observe the simultaneous creation and destruction of loans. Second, it may un-
derestimate gross flows if balance sheets are available at the institutional level rather than
at the branch level. Third, it may overestimate credit flows due to loan trading amongst
banks. Fourth, the interpretation of credit creation (destruction) may be unclear since we
6Together these two facts rationalize how there can be high levels of size inequality but low levels of bank-
ing concentration. In fact, our sample is composed in large part by small banks and a few big banks. These,
however, do not constitute the majority of credit outstanding since the Herfindal index is low.
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cannot distinguish whether credit creation occurs as a result of the extension of credit to
new clients or the increase in their existing stocks of loans. Lastly, it may misestimate credit
flows due to merger activity.
The use of historical data alleviates concerns arising from two methodological issues.
First, it allows us to suffer less from the underestimation of gross flows due to the unit
banking structure. In fact our balance sheets, effectively, represent branch level informa-
tion rather than institution level information due to the lack of branching7. Second, it
allows us to suffer less from the overestimation of gross flows due to loan trading. Due to
the high level of asymmetric information, lending was very relationship based and local
in this historical period (Bernanke (1983), Petersen and Rajan (2002)). In consequence, loan
trading was very uncommon if not completely absent. This implies that changes in loans
outstanding arise entirely due to changes in the overall supply of credit to firms, rather
than credit being reallocated across banks alone.
At the same time, the use of our historical dataset introduces three different types of
new issues. First, we may misestimate gross flows since we exclude nationally chartered
banks. Second, it worsens the bias introduced by mergers since we cannot accurately mea-
sure credit creation and destruction when state banks merge with national banks. Third,
it may misestimate gross flows if we do not control for spurious entries and exits of banks
in and out of our sample caused by changes in charter status. The latter two issues are
related because in both instances the growth rate of credit in the merger or charter switch
period will be unobserved.
To characterize gross credit flows we compute for each bank in our sample the change
in credit, ∆li,t, as the difference in credit outstanding at t and t−1. When two banks merge,
however, this approach is not feasible since one of the banks will have ceased to exist. We
therefore employ the methodology of Dell’Arriccia and Garibaldi to estimate credit growth
in the event of a merger. We refer to this as the adjusted change in credit and it is defined
7The exception is New York City in which branching within the five city boroughs was allowed.
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below.
Consider a merger between bank i (surviving bank) and bank j (non-surviving bank)
at time t. The adjusted change in credit for bank i is defined as:
∆l̃i,t = ∆li,t − φi,j(t)lj,t−1 (2.1)
where li,t is the value of loans outstanding at bank i at t, ∆li,t is the change in loans out-
standing at bank i and φi,j(t) is an indicator function that takes the value of 1 if bank i
acquires bank j at t. The difference between the unadjusted change in credit, ∆li,t, and the
adjusted change in credit, ∆l̃i,t, is that the latter accounts for the fact that part of the credit
growth experienced by bank i is determined by the absorption of bank j. Thus, credit cre-
ation in the combined entity is the total change in credit for bank i, the surviving bank,
minus the previous period’s value of loans that it inherits from the acquired bank.
The difficulty introduced by our dataset is that when a state and national bank merge,
the value of (2.1) is not defined. To see this, consider a state bank i (surviving bank) merg-
ing with a national bank j (non-surviving bank). Since bank j is a nationally chartered
bank, the value of lj,t−1 is unknown since our dataset only covers state chartered banks.
Thus, the adjusted change in credit cannot be computed and remains undefined. On the
other hand, the unadjusted change in credit may be computed, however, it will systemati-
cally overestimate ∆l̃i,t.
Thus in our sample there are, in fact, two types of mergers: mergers between state
chartered banks and mergers between a state and a nationally chartered bank. The differ-
ence is of consequence because, given our data, we may correctly characterize changes in
credit for mergers between state banks but not for those between a state and national bank.
In these instances the adjusted credit growth may not be computed and is undefined in
the quarter in which the merger occurs. The unadjusted credit growth may be computed,
however, this figure systematically overestimates credit creation (or destruction). Changes
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in the charter status of banks introduce an identical problem. In fact, when a nationally
chartered bank switches to a state charter we are also unable to compute the growth in
credit for this institution since we do not observe its balance sheet in the previous period.
Treating this bank as a new bank generates spurious credit creation. Thus, for this subset
of banks, either the change in credit is unobserved or it is systematically overestimated.
To understand how this issue impacts our measures of aggregate credit reallocation,
we proceed to define these quantities. Gross creation and destruction rates are computed
by aggregating the cross-section of positive and negative changes in credit respectively










for bank i s.t ∆l̃i,t < 0 (2.3)


























The term gi,t is the growth rate of credit at bank i
910. The term wi,t is the weight of gi,t
in the cross-section of credit growth. It is the average size of bank i between t − 1 and t
8See Dell’Arriccia and Garibaldi (2005) p.g. 671.
9The value of gi,t lies in [−2, 2] interval by construction. A value of -2 corresponds to an exit, a value of +2
to an entry.
10When bank i is not involved in a merger then ∆l̃i,t = ∆li,t as can be seen from (2.1).
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normalized by total loans outstanding at t−1. From (2.4) and (2.5) it is clear that aggregate
measures of creation and destruction are weighted averages of credit growth in the set of
expanding and contracting banks.
Charter switches and mergers between national and state banks in our sample imply
that in some quarters in the cross-section of banks there is a bank(s) for which gi,t is ei-
ther undefined or it is computed ignoring the merger correction. Including an unadjusted
estimate of gi,t in the cross-sectional mean will introduce an upward bias in the measure
of credit creation and destruction. This is unappealing because, at least in principle, all
reallocation may be driven by this spurious form of credit creation and destruction. We
therefore choose to redefine (2.4) and (2.5) to be the weighted sum of credit growth in the
set of banks for which this is observed.
More formally, let I+t (I
−
t ) be set of banks in quarter t for which the change in credit
is positive (negative) and that in that quarter are not involved a state to national merger
or charter switch. As well, denote with It the union of these two sets
11. Thus we compute














The extent and nature of the bias that this procedure induces in the measurement of ag-
gregate creation and destruction will depend on the mechanism that drives state banks to
merge with national banks or to switch charter. When this transition mechanism is exoge-
11By definition the set of banks It is a subset of the total number of banks in our sample for each quarter.
When in a quarter there are no state to national mergers or charter switches the sets coincide.
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nous to contemporaneous credit growth our measure is unbiased. We explore this issue in
more detail in section 2.4.4.
Finally, credit reallocation (SUM) is defined as the total amount of credit that is created
and destroyed. Excess credit reallocation (EXC) is the part of credit reallocation that is in
excess of the net change in credit (NET) expressed in absolute value.
SUMt = ˜POSt + ˜NEGt (2.11)
NETt = ˜POSt − ˜NEGt (2.12)
EXCt = SUMt − |NETt| (2.13)
2.4 Gross Credit Flows
In this section we first characterize the empirical properties of gross credit creation, de-
struction and excess reallocation in our sample. Second, we study the empirical properties
of gross credit flows across secured and unsecured credit. Third, we revisit the impact
of compositional effects in driving heterogeneous behavior by isolating the influence of
regional shocks. Finally, we perform two robustness checks.
2.4.1 Creation, Destruction and Reallocation
We structure our empirical analysis around three stylized facts about gross credit flows
documented in the literature. First we examine mean levels of credit reallocation. Second,
we illustrate the volatility properties of the flows and, third, their cyclical characteristics.
From a qualitative perspective our results are mostly in line with the literature. To facil-
itate the quantitative assessment of our results, we compare them to the three main ex-
isting contributions to this empirical literature (Dell’Arriccia and Garibaldi (2005), Craig
and Haubrich (2013), and Contessi and Francis (2010)). Note, however, that these papers
differ from ours in at least three dimensions. First, they document gross credit flows for
the entire United States. We instead document gross credit flows for state chartered banks
in the state of New York. Second, they study the period (or subperiods) between 1960 and
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2008. Our sample covers the period between 1912 and 1932. Third, the literature docu-
ments gross credit flows using balance sheet information obtained from the Call reports.
We instead use a dataset based on the annual report of the superintendent of the banking
department of the state of New York.
In line with the literature, we find that credit creation and destruction coexist across
the business cycle. This can be seen in figure 2.2, where we plot credit creation, destruction
and net credit growth over our sample period. Both creation and destruction remain posi-
tive and substantially above zero throughout. Across the sample, mean net credit growth
of 1.09% is the result of the simultaneous expansion of credit in the order of 4.74% and
credit destruction of about 3.64% (Table 2.2 column (1)). Excess reallocation of credit is in
the order of 4.71%. This implies that about 5% of loans outstanding in the previous period
are reallocated across banks in addition to any change in net credit. To put our results into
context we report in table 2.2 the mean and standard deviation of gross credit flows in
our sample (column (1)) and in the literature (columns (2)-(4)). We find levels of credit cre-
ation and destruction which are substantially higher. In particular, both credit creation and
destruction in our sample are about 2% higher than those measured by any of the other
studies. The exception is credit creation measured by Contessi and Francis (column (4)).
However, this result is driven by the substantially higher level of mean net credit growth
in their sample relative to all other samples (3.08% vs. 1-2%). Their sample includes the
credit boom of the 2000s but not bust phase since the sample ends in early 2008. Our sam-
ple on the other hand includes both the 1920s boom and the bust in the late 1920s and
early 1930s. Looking at excess reallocation we confirm our result that our sample exhibits
substantially higher levels of heterogeneity in bank behavior. In fact, mean excess credit
reallocation is 4.71% in our sample, while the literature estimates its range to be between
2.64% - 2.69%.
The fact that we find higher levels of creation, destruction and excess reallocation,
however, is not surprising. In fact, we have argued that the benefit of studying this sam-
ple period stems from the unit banking structure of the sector. This implies that in our
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sample we are, in practice, able to measure credit reallocation at the branch level while
the Call report data, which underlies the results documented in the literature, only allows
the researcher to characterize credit reallocation at the bank holding company (BHC) level.
Since BHC level data aggregates balance sheets across multiple branches, the smallest unit
of observation in our sample is substantially smaller than that in literature. We believe that
this allows us to measure heterogeneity in behavior more precisely and that this drives our
results in table 2.2. Additionally, we believe that another advantage of this sample relative
to that studied in the literature is the lower level of concentration in the banking system.
In fact, conditional on the unit of observation, heterogeneity is better measured when the
banking sector is less concentrated. The concentration of the banking sector in this period
is in fact far lower (see table 2.1) that that studied by the literature. The Herfindal index of
banking concentration in our sample fluctuates around 0.04-0.05, while it fluctuates in the
range 0.5-0.9 between 1979 and 199912. This lower concentration rate is in part due to the
unit banking nature of the system. Finally, we note that it is possible that the results we
document are driven by the bias introduced into our sample by national to state charter
switches and mergers. We discuss this issue in section 2.4.4.
We now turn to the volatility properties of the series. Two facts are noteworthy. First,
absolute levels of volatility for all series are far higher in our sample than in the literature.
Second, we find that credit destruction is more volatile than credit creation, however, the
difference between the two series is not as strong as that documented in the literature. In
fact, in our sample the coefficients of variation for creation and destruction are respectively
0.58 and 0.71. In the literature, the coefficients of variation for credit creation (destruction)
range from .3 to .33 (.41 to .53)13. Thus, in the literature, destruction is between 30% to
50% more volatile than creation but only 20% more volatile in our sample. This asymme-
try in volatilities is a key feature of credit friction models14. Our results suggest that the
12See Dell’Arriccia and Garibaldi (2005), p.g. 668, table 1.
13Coefficients of variation for credit destruction are .42, .53 and .41 respectively for DAG, CH and CF. Coef-
ficients of variation for credit creation are .32, .33 and .3 respectively for DAG, CH and CF. Computations are
based on the results reported in table 2.2.
14The asymmetry arises because after a positive aggregate shock credit expansion cannot react immediately
since it takes time to screen projects. In response to a negative shock, however, the termination of a credit
relationship is not subject to this constraint.
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difference between the two margins is not as marked in this period. This may be due to
the existence of closer informational ties between banks and clients in the unit banking
system that makes creation less subject to moral hazard. When we exclude from our anal-
ysis New York City banks (see section 2.4.4) the volatility of creation and destruction are
almost identical.
There are two possible explanations for this difference in the absolute volatility we
document. First underlying aggregate activity might be more volatile due the difference
in the fundamental volatility of aggregate shocks or the policy environment (e.g. lack of
countercyclical policy). In line with the results of Romer (1991), we find strong evidence of
this in the data. The standard deviation of industrial production q-on-q growth between
1919:Q2 and 1932:Q4 is 6.44%. In the sample period studied by Dell’Arriccia and Garibaldi
it is 1.4%. Thus our sample exhibits aggregate business cycle volatility that is roughly 4
times larger15. This difference in scale matches exactly the difference in magnitude of the
standard deviation of net credit growth in our sample (4.84%) relative to the literature
(1.46%, 1.52%, 1.66%). Second, we argue that the lack of branching may also explain some
of the time-series variation we document. In fact, in the presence of idiosyncratic credit
demand and supply shocks, branching allows bank holding companies to diversify these
shocks. On the other hand, when bank are organized as individual and independent units,
there is potential mismatch between the supply and demand of credit, which may induce
additional variation into the aggregate (Gabaix (2011)).
We now proceed to characterize the cyclical properties of credit flows. Implementation
of this in a way that is comparable to the literature, however, is not trivial. In fact, in this
historical period (1912-1932) nominal GDP growth16, the measure of cyclicality used in the
literature, is not available on a quarterly basis. GDP figures are only available at the annual
frequency for our sample period. Another natural proxy of the national business cycle is
15This difference in aggregate volatility persists even when compared to the Craig and Haubrich and Con-
tessi and Francis samples. The standard deviation of industrial production is respectively 1.6% and 1.64% in
their samples.
16This literature employs nominal GDP instead of real GDP since credit creation and destruction is measured
in terms of nominal loan values.
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industrial production which is available monthly starting January 1919. However, this is a
national measure of the business cycle. Our measures of gross credit growth on the other
hand are defined at the state level. We therefore also proxy state level business cycle vari-
ation with nominal retail sales for the New York Federal Reserve district. Though the data
does not strictly refer to the New York State, the state represented no less than two-thirds
of the population in the Federal Reserve district in this period. Data on nominal retail
sales is obtained from the Federal Reserve bulletin and is available starting from 1919:Q1.
This data series is seasonally adjusted using the Census X-11 procedure as implemented
by EViews.
In figure 2.3 we plot year on year growth rates for log industrial production, log retail
sales and net credit. We have superimposed the NBER recessions in grey. Both cyclical
measures are available only from 1919:Q1, thus the first two recessions in the sample are
excluded. Of the national recessions in this period, only in the 1920-1921, 1923-1924 and
1929 recessions do retail sales slow or fall. During the 1926-1927 national recession, how-
ever, retail sales maintain a roughly constant growth rate. The time-series pattern in retail
sales is also in line with net credit growth. In fact, there are slowdowns in credit growth
in the 1920-1921, 1923-192417 and 1929 recessions, but not in 1926-1927 recession. For all
results on the cyclicality of flows we report results for both the industrial production series
as well as retail sales.
In table 2.3 we report the contemporaneous correlation between industrial production
and retail sales and our various measures of gross credit flows. In line with the litera-
ture, we find that gross creation is pro-cyclical while destruction is countercyclical. On the
other hand, we find that excess reallocation is strongly pro-cyclical instead of countercycli-
cal. The pro-cyclicality of excess reallocation seems to be driven by the strong pro-cyclical
nature of credit creation. This is in sharp contrast with the results of Dell’Arriccia and
Garibaldi (2005), who find that the countercyclicality of excess credit reallocation is driven
17This is not clearly visible in the figure using year on year changes. Looking at quarterly changes, however,
there is a sharp but brief contraction of credit in the period in question.
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by the countercyclical nature of credit destruction.
The latter authors suggest that the countercyclicality of excess credit reallocation is a
result of the cleansing effect of recessions. Excess reallocation of credit occurs as banks
actively reduce lending to unsuccessful firms and increase lending to new projects to re-
flect the changed prospects of the firms in their portfolio. Through the lens of their model
(Dell’Arriccia and Garibaldi (1998))18, recessions can therefore be characterized as periods
in which the loan portfolio is skewed towards loans with high separation probability and
high returns. This reallocation activity, however, raises the riskiness of the loan portfolio
since credit restructuring is subject to transaction costs and potential credit losses. A key
difference between the historical period studied by Dell’Arriccia and Garibaldi and ours
is that deposits were not federally insured prior to 193319. Due to the lack of deposit in-
surance, during recessions, depositors withdrew liquidity from banks in response to the
higher default risk of the banking institutions (Pennacchi (2006)). It is thus reasonable to
assume that banks respond to the threat of deposit outflows by choosing not to increase the
riskiness of their balance sheet by turning over their portfolio during the recession. In fact,
in the recession, the firm is already subject to higher default probability due to the aggre-
gate state. It may thus choose to optimally liquidate unsuccessful but viable investments
during periods in which the bank’s default probability is low. In essence, pro-cyclical ex-
cess reallocation may occur because banks delay the portfolio reallocation that is induced
by the recession because they spread credit risks across the cycle (e.g. default risk in the
recession, reallocation risk in the expansion). Another related possibility is that credit re-
structuring is more costly in the recession (e.g. if firms are temporarily illiquid) than in the
expansion. In this setting, banks may prefer to liquidate low profitability investments with
delay and forgo the additional profits of funding better projects to avoid the increased risk
and losses from credit restructuring in the recession.
18In such a model banks must choose whether to invest in risky projects or in risk less money market instru-
ments. These projects are ordered by their risk adjusted return so that project profitability can be ranked. As a
consequence, the set of risky projects that gets funded increases when the return to money market instruments
falls. Excess reallocation of credit occurs through two channels. First, for a given project type, existing projects
fail and new ones are funded in its place. Second, the set of funded projects varies in function of the interest
rate and this affects excess reallocation since it depends on the total loans outstanding.
19The FDIC was instituted with the Banking act of 1933 (Preston (1933)).
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2.4.2 Gross credit flows and collateral
A distinctive feature of our data is the category breakdown of total loans outstanding. In
fact, loan categories in our dataset are defined in function of the collateral type that secures
the loan rather than the purpose of the loan. This is a particularly interesting feature of the
data when studying the properties of gross credit flows. This is because collateral alters
the informational asymmetries that exist between borrowers and lenders (Bester (1987)).
Additionally, it may as well affect the cost and speed with which credit relationships may
be terminated (e.g. if the lender can seize the collateral). This difference in the nature of
the extension of new loans and the cancellation of non-performing assets is what motivates
the literature on gross credit flows. It stands to reason that across collateral type, the prop-
erties of creation, destruction and excess reallocation will also vary since collateral affects
the parameters that govern these processes. In this section, therefore, we illustrate how the
properties of gross credit flows vary in function of the underlying collateral and try to in-
terpret these results in light of a benchmark credit frictions model like that of Dell’Arriccia
and Garibaldi (1998).
In our balance sheet data there are four loan categories: loans secured by bonds and
real estate, loans secured by mortgages, loans secured by other collateral and unsecured
loans. We aggregate into one category the first two types on the basis that the underlying
collateral is similar. We refer to this category as loans secured by bonds and real estate. We
treat as separate categories loans secured by bonds and real estate and loans secured by
other (stocks in large part) due the different volatilities and cyclical properties of the un-
derlying collateral. Given these collateral categories, we would expect the ease with which
a credit relationship is formed, and hence the matching rate, to decrease as we moved from
loans secured by bonds and real estate, to loans secured by stocks to unsecured loans. This
is because we expect that the ease with which credit relationships are formed to be increas-
ing in the quality of collateral. Unsecured loans have no collateral and therefore have the
lowest matching rate. Loans secured by stocks are likely to have a lower matching parame-
ter than equivalent loans secured by bonds given the volatility and perhaps pro-cyclicality
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of stock values.
In table 2.4 we report mean and standard deviation of creation, destruction and excess
reallocation for the three loan categories. Three main facts emerge. First, mean creation,
destruction and excess reallocation across the three loan categories are higher than their
equivalent measures for total loans in table 2.2. This is a symptom of the fact that within
banks there is reallocation of credit across the three categories. That is, credit secured by
real estate and bonds may be expanding exactly when unsecured credit is contracting20.
Further, such reallocation is likely to be occurring in function of the business cycle as we
document below. Second, we find that the relative volatility of credit creation and destruc-
tion varies across loan categories. In particular, we find that for both loans secured by
bonds and real estate as well as loans secured by stock, credit creation is relatively more
volatile than credit destruction. The coefficients of variation for creation (destruction) are
respectively .61 and .64 (.45 and .48). In the unsecured segment we instead find that de-
struction is relatively more volatile (0.59 against .51) as documented by Dell’Arriccia and
Garibaldi (2005). Third, creation, destruction and excess reallocation for loans secured by
stocks and unsecured loans is higher than that of credit secured by bonds and real estate.
In table 2.5 we report the contemporaneous correlation between our cyclical measures,
retail sales and industrial production, and gross credit flows. A pattern that emerges from
the data is that creation and destruction of credit have different cyclical properties across
loan categories, though these are statistically significant only for industrial production. In
particular, we find that credit creation is pro-cyclical for loans secured by bonds and real
estate, but it is almost acyclical for unsecured loans. On the destruction side, we find that
for loans secured by bonds and real state the destruction rate is almost acyclical while it is
countercyclical for both loans secured by stock and unsecured loans.
20To see this consider a bank which is expanding credit in the secured segment and contracting it by an
equal amount in the unsecured segment. At the loan category level, this bank contributes to both creation, in
secured loans, and destruction, in unsecured loans. However, across categories the bank neither expands nor
contracts. When a number of banks are engaging in such activities, the mean creation and destruction by loan
category will result to be higher than that of the aggregate.
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The key issue is to what extent the results outlined in tables 2.4 and 2.5 are consistent
with our priors on the matching parameter. We start by noting that with regards to mean
levels of creation, destruction and excess reallocation the model does not make clear cut
predictions. In fact, while the increase in the matching rate directly increases mean levels
of creation, it also has two indirect effects. In fact, the increased ease with which banks
encounter projects implies that (i) banks only fund the most profitable projects (ii) when
the number of total projects available in the economy is fixed, the number of unmatched
projects available for a match falls. Thus, the effect on creation is undetermined and mean
levels of the variables cannot be used to discriminate characteristics of the model. Further,
since in the steady state of the model of Dell’Arriccia and Garibaldi creation and destruc-
tion are equal, the effect of the matching parameter on excess credit reallocation is also
undetermined.
Turning to the properties of credit creation, which the matching parameter directly
influences, two results are consistent with our priors. First, the coefficient of variation on
creation is higher for loans secured by bonds and real estate than for unsecured loans. In
fact, if these loan categories are subject to common aggregate shocks, then this is the ex-
pected result since the matching coefficient controls the strength of the response of creation
to aggregate shocks. Second, the pro-cyclicality of creation is stronger for loans secured
by bonds and real estate than for unsecured loans. Since creation is a frictioned process,
the effect of a credit demand shock (e.g. an increase in the number of projects to fund)
is distributed over multiple periods as the demand imbalance is only slowly accommo-
dated. The slower the process with which the shock unwinds (e.g. low matching rate),
the more the credit friction attenuates the positive correlation between creation and the
original shock.
Differences in the matching parameter alone, however, cannot explain a number of
other results we find. First, the fact that credit destruction is acyclical for loans secured
by bonds and real estate and countercyclical for unsecured loans. Second, the difference
in the relative volatility between creation and destruction that exists across loans secured
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by bonds and real estate and unsecured loans. These findings suggest two characteristics
of a model that can rationalize our results. First, the destruction process is also subject
to frictions (e.g. administrative bottle-necks, delays in credit recovery). Second, differ-
ences in collateral not only affect the ease with which credit relationships are formed but
also the ease with which they are destroyed. As in the above discussion, frictions on the
destruction side help rationalize both the cyclical properties and the relative volatility of
credit destruction. Further, we note that the empirical properties of creation and destruc-
tion are such that a high matching rate is associated with a low separation rate (and vice
versa). Therefore, any mechanism by which collateral aids the formation of credit rela-
tionships but impedes their separation squares off the empirical results described in this
paragraph and the previous. A simple way in which this could arise is when loan qual-
ity is positively correlated with collateral type (e.g. because collateral signals quality). In
creation, collateral reduces informational asymmetry and therefore allows for faster and
more cyclical creation of loans. On the destruction side, collateralized loans default mostly
for idiosyncratic reasons, hence the lack of cyclicality in destruction. For uncollateralized
loans, creation is an acyclical process due to screening, while destruction is countercyclical
due to the high sensitivity of these loans to aggregate shocks.
Finally, we note that loans secured by stocks display far higher levels of cyclicality
then the other categories. We believe that this result is driven by the fact that, for this
loan category, the collateral value is cyclical. The strong pro-cyclicality of creation may be
driven by the fact that the screening process is lax when collateral values are high and/or
collateral is abundant. As in section 2.4.1, the pro-cyclicality of excess reallocation instead
is driven by the desire to liquidate and reallocate the portfolio when collateral values are
high to limit potential credit losses. Another interesting finding is that excess credit real-
location is acyclical for both loans secured by bonds and real estate and unsecured loans.
This suggests that the matching rate and, based on our above interpretation, the separation
parameter do not influence the cyclicality of excess reallocation.
Overall, our results suggest that collateral does influence the probability of establish-
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ing a credit relationship. Moreover, they suggest an inverse relationship between the
matching parameter and that governing credit destruction. The results also suggest that
the cyclicality of collateral drives at in least in part the cyclical properties of gross credit
flows. In fact, excess reallocation displays significant cyclical variation only for loan se-
cured by stocks.
2.4.3 Heterogeneous regional shocks
As has been pointed out in the literature, the heterogeneity in gross flows we document
in section 2.4.1 may arise due to compositional effects. In particular, Dell’Arriccia and
Garibaldi (2005) study the extent to which excess reallocation arises, amongst others, due
to heterogeneous regional shocks. A key difficulty in carrying out such analysis with their
data, however, is the fact that Call reports possess almost no information about the ge-
ographic dispersion of the bank’s economic activities. The information they contain is
mostly related to the location of the headquarters of the bank. However, when loan de-
cisions are made at the branch level and branches span multiple states, identifying the
regional shock with the state in which this bank is headquartered does not cleanly identify
regional shocks.
In this dimension our data allows for far cleaner identification of regional shocks. In
fact, the banks we analyze are unit banks. In addition to that, banks made loans only
within their local market due to informational asymmetries (Bernanke (1983)). This im-
plies that there is a clear correspondence between the bank’s location and its economic
activity in our data. We therefore collect data on hamlets, towns, villages and cities in the
state of New York from the New York State Library to map the location of the banks into
their respective county and region within the New York State. We are able to match all but
2 banks in our sample. There are 62 counties in the state of New York and 9 regions. Coun-
ties are regional aggregations that are too small to be suitable for our analysis since in many
counties we observe no more than a few banks. Due to the limits of the methodology, if
all regional aggregations contained only one bank, then all variation in credit reallocation
would be attributed to regional shocks. We therefore must strike a balance between the
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level of aggregation and the heterogeneity in the shocks. Regions are the next level of ag-
gregation and we therefore perform our analysis at this level. Across these 9 regions there
is substantial heterogeneity in the number of banks. The New York City region stands out.
Alone it represents 35-45% of the banks in our sample. This is not surprising since New
York City was a major financial center at the time. On the other hand, even in the region
with lowest number of banks (Eastern Adirondacks) there are 15 banks. On average there
are 61 banks in each region.
To decompose the proportion of flows that are attributable to heterogeneous shocks
at the regional level we borrow the methodology of Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) and















where j is the region subscript. If within a region there is only credit creation or destruc-
tion then it must be that the sum of creation and destruction equals their difference - i.e.
SUMj,t = |NETj,t|21. If this occurs in every region then reallocation is fully driven by
regional shocks and the between index takes a value of 1. We find that about 24.7% of
aggregate credit reallocation can be explained by heterogeneous regional shocks. This es-
timate increases to 27.3% when we exclude the New York region from the set of regions
J . To put this figure into perspective Dell’Arriccia and Garibaldi (2005) find that only 10%
of the excess reallocation is attributable to regional shocks. On the other hand, regional
shocks matter far less for bank credit reallocation than for job, sales and firm credit reallo-
cation (Herrera et al. (2011)).
Our decomposition of this variation and that of Dell’Arriccia and Garibaldi are, how-
ever, only partially comparable since the studies differ in the time-period under study and
in the geographical coverage. In particular, they study heterogeneous shocks at the state
level, while we study within state heterogeneous shocks at the region level. To the extent
21The quantities are defined in section 2.3
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that, within states, there is important heterogeneity then our results are complementary
to theirs. On the other hand, if shocks within states are sufficiently homogeneous then
our finding that between variation accounts for more of credit reallocation depends on the
cleaner identification of the shocks.
Finally, we discuss two potential pitfalls our identification strategy. First, the regions
we partition our sample into are administrative divisions. Identification of the regional
shocks depends on economic aggregations that are subject to common shocks. Since we
cannot investigate the heterogeneity of shocks within regions, we cannot rule out that more
of the variation in creation is actually attributable to heterogeneous shocks. Our estimate is
therefore downwardly biased in this sense. Second, in regions that have few banks, credit
creation and destruction is hard to effectively measure. Since we can measure creation and
destruction only across banks, rather than within a bank, regions in which there are fewer
banks may appear less heterogeneous than they actually are. In the limit, if all regions
had only a single bank then all excess reallocation would be attributed to heterogeneous
shocks. In this sense, we may overestimate the importance of regional shocks.
2.4.4 Robustness checks
In this section we investigate to what extent our results may be influenced by banks switch-
ing across state and national charter status. We do this in two ways. First we investigate
to what extent charter switches are correlated with credit growth. Second, we show how
our results are affected when we exclude New York City banks from our sample.
Systematic charter switches
As discussed in section 2.3, we are able to characterize gross credit creation and destruc-
tion for New York State only under two key assumptions. First, that state and national
banks do not differ systematically in their heterogeneity. Second, that the growth rate of
credit for banks switching across charter status is not systematically different from that of
banks that maintain a state charter. We cannot perform a direct test of these assumptions,
however, we may investigate the association between lagged quarterly (or yearly) growth
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in credit and charter status switches22.
In particular, we consider two sources of potential spurious credit growth. First, we
consider spurious credit destruction that arises due to state banks being acquired by na-
tional banks or state banks moving to a national charter. Second, we consider spurious
credit creation that occurs when state banks acquire national banks. For each of these
types of events, we check whether lagged quarterly (or yearly) credit growth is a predic-
tor of charter change with a panel probit regression. In the first case, the switchers are
defined as state banks moving to a national charter and the stayers are all banks that main-
tain a state charter. In the second case, switchers are defined as state banks acquiring a
national bank, stayers are defined as before. We study these events separately as presum-
ably the selection mechanism operates in diametrically opposite ways. Banks exiting the
sample are likely to be experiencing lower levels of loan growth than banks which are ac-
tively expanding by acquiring other banks. Finally, note that the two switchers definitions
are mutually exclusive but not collectively exhaustive as neither includes national banks
switching to a state charter. These cannot be included into the second group as we do not
observe credit growth prior to merger. We only observe credit growth for these banks in
the periods successive to the merger period.
In both regressions the baseline control set includes the log of outstanding loans in the
period previous to the merger and a dummy for the bank being incorporated in any of the
five boroughs of New York City. The size of the loan book is used to control for a possible
size effect in switching. We include a dummy for banks incorporated in New York City
since two-thirds of all the mergers, both state to state and state to national, in our sample
occur in the city. We consider two different RHS measure of lagged credit growth: quar-
terly credit growth - models (1) - (3) - and yearly credit growth - models (4) - (6). Standard
errors are computed with bank level clustering. Models (2),(3),(5) and (6) include time
22This is not a direct test. In fact, it is always possible that in the merger period banks moving across charters
behave systematically differently from other banks, even if lagged/trend credit growth was not systematically
different. Nonetheless, since loan growth is a persistent process and mergers are often planned prior to the
merger period we think this exercise can be informative of the relationship between charter switches and
credit growth.
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fixed effects to account for common shocks. The inclusion of fixed effects in panel probit
analysis is complicated by an incidental parameters problem (Chamberlain (1984)). In fact,
the number of parameters that must be estimated in this non linear model increases with
the sample size rendering the MLE estimates inconsistent unless both panel dimensions go
to infinity. In our context, however, this problem is attenuated as we estimate time fixed
effects in a panel with small T and large N so that the number of incidental parameters
remains contained relative to the sample size23 .
In table 2.6 we report the estimated coefficients for the case of spurious exit. The base-
line regression coefficients are reported in columns (1) and (4). We find that there is a pos-
itive size effect, and a strong New York City effect. Thus, larger banks switch with higher
probability to a national charter and this is especially true in New York City. There is
a borderline significant and negative association between lagged quarterly credit growth
and charter switches. This suggests that banks exiting the sample are shrinking faster
than the average. Note that this would induce a downward bias in our credit destruction
measure if the pattern also holds for the merger quarter. The significance of this nega-
tive coefficient on credit growth, however, may be driven by differences in average credit
growth across time rather than across banks. In fact, a significant proportion of the state
to national bank switches occur during the Great Depression. In this period loan growth
is significantly more negative than the average. We therefore include time fixed effects to
resolve this issue. Once we include them in our regression, the statistical significance of
this coefficient goes away, though the magnitude remains roughly constant. We point out
that the inclusion of time fixed effects drastically reduces the number of observations. This
is because in the vast majority of quarters, there are no state to national charter transitions
and thus the time fixed alone perfectly predicts the outcome. Finally, in models (3) and
(6) we re-estimate this model using only banks in New York City24. We do this because it
23In practice, despite the fact that we have 85 quarters of data, there will be far less time dummies to es-
timate. In fact, we only require estimation of time dummies for quarters in which there are state to national
charter switches or mergers. All other quarters are dropped since the time fixed effect perfectly predicts the
outcome (i.e. no charter switches). Since the panel is roughly balanced, the proportion of incidental parame-
ters to the sample size remains constant.
24For obvious reasons the New York City dummy is dropped in this specification.
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is possible that switching is associated with loan growth in New York City but not in the
rest of the state where state charters were far more common than national charters. Again
we find no evidence of a statistically significant relationship between lagged credit growth
and charter switches.
In table 2.7 we report the estimated coefficients for the case of spurious entry. The re-
sults are similar to the ones discussed above. We find that state banks acquiring national
banks are typically bigger banks. As well, we find no statistically significant relationship
between lagged credit growth and this type of merger once we control for time fixed ef-
fects (columns (2) and (4)). The sign of the coefficient is positive suggesting that our proce-
dure systematically excludes from our credit creation measure banks which are expanding
credit faster in the quarter previous to the merger than the average state bank. Thus we
may underestimate credit creation when we exclude these observations. If these patterns
also hold in the merger quarter, this suggests that we may underestimate both creation and
destruction and in consequence excess reallocation. Thus our finding that average excess
reallocation is higher than that measured in the literature does not seem to be driven by
our treatment of state to national charter switches. Finally, we could include town fixed
effects in our regressions to control for heterogeneity in transition rates across towns. It
turns out that the only important heterogeneity in this sense is well captured by our New
York City dummy.
Gross credit flows in New York State
As discussed in section 2.3, the major drawback of our sample is the lack of data on na-
tionally chartered banks. This problem complicates our measurement of aggregate gross
credit flows since we are unable to characterize the behavior of banks merging or moving
across charter status in the cross-section of credit growth. An important characteristic of
our sample is that the incidence of this type of mergers or charter status changes is very
low outside of New York City. In fact, there are a total of 156 mergers or charter changes
in our sample. However, only about a fifth of these events occur outside New York City
(34). Further, of these 34 instances 26 are mergers between state chartered banks or trusts
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and therefore pose no measurement difficulty. Of the remaining 8 events, we have two
instances in which nationally chartered banks become state chartered banks and thus en-
ter our sample. We have one instance in which a state bank absorbs a national bank and
maintains a state charter25. In both cases these events generate spurious credit creation. We
have five instances in which state banks merge with a national bank and exit the sample26.
These events generate spurious credit destruction. In addition, these events are concen-
trated around a particular set of dates and therefore the vast majority of the time-series is
actually not affected by these particular merger events.
We therefore study creation, destruction and excess reallocation in the New York State
subsample to investigate to what extent the higher levels of excess credit reallocation and
its pro-cyclicality we documented are driven by our inability to measure credit growth for
state to national charter transitions. We do this in two steps. First, we show the extent
to which total credit creation and destruction in the New York state sample are driven by
spurious credit creation and destruction. We then proceed to verify that the results in sec-
tion 2.4.1 remain true also for this subsample.
In figure 2.4 we plot in red the level of total credit creation (top panel) and destruc-
tion (bottom panel). Differently from the previous sections, we include in total credit cre-
ation both true credit creation (as before) as well as spurious credit creation. We do this
to highlight the instances in which spurious credit creation affects our measurement of
gross credit flows. In both panels, in blue we plot two subcomponents of total credit cre-
ation (destruction): spurious creation (destruction) and creation (destruction) due to entry
(exit). In dark blue we plot the part of credit creation (destruction) that occurs because of
regular entry (exit). In light blue we plot instead the creation (destruction) of credit that
occurs because of spurious entry, charter switches and exit. The figure illustrates two facts:
first, between the creation and destruction series only three observations are contaminated
25Mount Vernon Trust Company merges with American Bank and Trust Company of Mount Vernon
26In particular we have that Mechanics Bank of Groton merges with First National Bank of Groton, Bingham
State Bank merges with Genesee River National Bank and Trust Co, Livonia State Bank switches charter,
Yonkers Trust Company merges with First National Bank of Yonkers, Livingston County Trust Company
becomes a national bank.
78
by spurious credit creation and destruction. That is, 82 of the 85 quarters in which we
characterize creation, destruction and excess reallocation are independent of how we treat
state to national (or vice versa) charter switches. There are a total of 8 instances in which
we observe charter switches in this subsample, however, these concentrate around only 3
dates. Second, the overwhelming majority of credit creation and destruction occurs across
banks that remain active and keep their charter status. Note as well that if we had misclas-
sified entry or exit of national banks in our merger file these would show up in the entry
and exit series. We find no evidence of any misclassification in this sense.
In table 2.8 we report the mean, standard deviation and contemporaneous correlation
with IP and nominal retail sales of gross credit creation, destruction and excess reallocation
for New York State. We include in the table the results for the full sample from tables 2.2
and 2.3 for comparability. We find that our basic findings are confirmed in this sample
though the magnitudes are smaller. In particular, excess reallocation falls to 3.46% from
4.71%. This is still higher than that in the literature (2.6%), but not substantially larger.
We also find that the pro-cyclical nature of excess credit reallocation is confirmed thought
it is not statistically significant when using industrial production as the cyclical measure
in the subsample. Overall, we conclude that the results we have presented throughout
this paper do not seem to be substantially influenced by our treatment of national to state
charter switches and mergers.
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper we have studied gross credit flows for the state of New York using balance
sheet data collected from the annual report of the superintendent of the banking depart-
ment of this state. We focus our analysis on this historical period, due to the unit banking
nature of the financial system. The lack of branching allows us to measure heterogeneity in
credit expansion and contraction across banks to a finer degree than has been previously
possible. Consistent with this premise, we find higher levels of gross credit creation, de-
struction and excess reallocation than those documented in the literature. In particular, we
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find that mean excess reallocation in our sample is in the order of 4.71%, almost twice the
estimate of the previous literature. This result is subject to an important caveat. Since we
do not observe balance sheets for nationally chartered banks we are unable to characterize
credit growth in the merger quarter for the set of banks that switches charter. This may
induce bias into our estimates of gross credit flows. To the extent that it is possible given
our data, we show that the likely bias in our sample actually attenuates our results rather
than magnifies them. Further, when we limit our sample to a subsample in which this
problem is very limited we still find higher levels of excess credit reallocation than in the
literature, albeit slightly lower ones than in the full sample.
Finally, we also documented the behavior of gross bank credit flows by collateral type.
We find that collateralized loans are pro-cyclical in the creation margin, but acyclical in
the destruction margin. On the other hand, uncollateralized loans are acyclical in creation
but countercyclical in destruction. As well, we find that creation is more volatile than
destruction for collateralized loans, while the opposite is true for uncollateralized loans.
These results suggest that collateral reduces the informational asymmetry between bor-
rowers and lenders making the creation margin more volatile and responsive to business
cycle fluctuations than it would otherwise be. Further, they suggest an inverse relationship
between the matching rate and the separation rate and that these two parameters do not




Figure 2.1: Assets and Liabilities Reported
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Figure 2.2: Net credit growth and excess reallocation
The top panel reports the time-series of credit creation, destruction and net credit growth.
The bottom panel reports net credit growth and excess credit reallocation. Shaded in grey
are the NBER national recession dates.






























Figure 2.3: Business Cycle proxies: National and State level
Industrial production growth, retail sales and net credit growth are reported as y-on-y
growth rates to facilitate comparison. Industrial production is obtained from FRED
(mnemonic INDPRO) and is a national figure. Nominal Retail Sales are obtained from the
Federal Reserve bulletin and are specific to the New York Federal Reserve district.
Shaded in grey are the NBER national recession dates.













Figure 2.4: Creation and Destruction in NY state
Total credit creation (top panel) and destruction (bottom panel) for the state of New York
(in red). In dark blue we plot the creation and destruction subcomponents that arise due
to entry and exit of banks. In light blue we plot the amount of spurious credit creation
and destruction. Shaded in grey are the NBER national recession dates.



















































Table 2.1: Evolution of the State Chartered Banks and Trusts in NY State, 1912-1932
Sample statistics are reported for the 4th quarter of each year. Num. Banks is the number
of banks with non-zero assets in the fourth quarter of the year. Agg. Loans is the value of
total loans across state banks relative to total loans across state banks in 1912.
Year Num. Banks Agg. Loans Herfindal Gini
1912 280 100.00 0.03 0.782
1913 277 98.19 0.03 0.787
1914 287 105.60 0.03 0.805
1915 290 138.66 0.05 0.843
1916 296 156.87 0.05 0.841
1917 314 168.12 0.05 0.839
1918 310 181.91 0.06 0.848
1919 324 224.73 0.06 0.845
1920 343 243.43 0.05 0.846
1921 340 203.64 0.04 0.836
1922 344 213.12 0.04 0.843
1923 358 239.60 0.03 0.845
1924 373 278.04 0.04 0.86
1925 378 309.57 0.03 0.851
1926 398 339.93 0.03 0.845
1927 392 381.27 0.04 0.853
1928 393 450.36 0.04 0.866
1929 391 574.56 0.05 0.89
1930 376 448.27 0.06 0.888
1931 364 331.77 0.06 0.88
1932 323 253.65 0.05 0.88
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Table 2.2: Creation, Destruction and Excess Reallocation
We report the mean and associated standard deviation in parenthesis of the quarterly growth rate
of net credit, gross credit creation, destruction and excess reallocation in our sample and the
literature - as reported in Dell’Arriccia and Garibaldi (2005), Table 3, p.g. 675, Craig and Haubrich
(2013), Table 1, P.g. 408, Contessi and Francis (2010), Table 1, p.g. 435. Note that we measure credit
flows only for state chartered banks and trusts within New York State. The literature reports credit
flows for the entire United States. All figures are in percentage points.
Existing literature
CP (2015) DAG (2005) CH (2013) CF (2010)
1912:Q2 - 1932:Q4 1979:Q2 - 1999:Q2 1960:Q1-2004:Q3 1999:Q1 - 2008:Q2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NET 1.09 1.76 .86 3.08
(4.54) (1.46) (1.52) (1.66)
POS 4.74 3.18 2.91 4.40
(2.77) (1.02) (0.97) (1.43)
NEG 3.64 1.42 2.04 1.32
(2.46) (0.62) (1.09) (0.54)
EXC 4.71 2.69 - 2.64
(2.14) (0.98) - (1.07)
Table 2.3: Creation, Destruction and Excess Reallocation: Correlation with the Business
Cycle
All flows are seasonally adjusted using the EViews X-11 procedure. GDP, IP and retail
sales (RS) and gross credit flows are the cyclical component of the respective variables.
This is defined as the deviation of the log level of the variable from its HP filtered trend.
The correlations reported for DAG (2005) and CF (2010) are based on contemporaneous
correlation as reported in Dell’Arriccia and Garibaldi (2005), Table 6, p.g. 678 and
Contessi and Francis (2010), Table 2, p.g. 438. Industrial production is obtained from
FRED (mnemonic INDPRO) and is a national aggregate. Nominal Retail Sales are
obtained from the Federal Reserve Bulletin and refer to the New York Federal Reserve
district. Standard errors are Newey-West standard errors with lag length set to 4 quarters.
Existing literature
CP (2015) DAG (2005) CF (2010)
1919:Q2 - 1932:Q4 1979:Q2 - 1999:Q2 1999:Q1 - 2008:Q2
Corr(•, IP ) Corr(•, RS) Corr(•, GDP ) Corr(•, GDP )
POS .64*** .86*** .35 .38
(.22 ) (.06) . .
NEG -.49** -.44 -.32 -.46
(.23) (.32) . .
EXC .71*** .68*** -.29 -.46
(.12 ) (.06) . .
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Table 2.4: Creation, Destruction and Excess Reallocation by collateral type
The table reports the mean and standard deviation, in parenthesis, of the quarterly
growth rate of nominal gross credit creation, destruction and excess reallocation for loans
secured by bonds and real estate, loans secured by stocks, and unsecured loans. All
figures are in percentage points.
Loans secured by:
Unsecured Loans
Bonds and Real Estate Other/Stocks
POS 5.86 7.22 7.04
(3.54) (4.61) (3.68)
NEG 4.25 6.15 5.80
(1.95) (2.99) (3.47)
EXC 7.10 8.34 7.96
(2.44) (3.56) (3.25)
Table 2.5: Creation, Destruction and Excess Reallocation by collateral type: Correlation
with the Business Cycle
All flows are seasonally adjusted using the EViews X-11 procedure. IP, retail sales (RS)
and gross credit flows are the cyclical component of the log level. This is defined as the
deviation of the log level of the variable from its HP filtered trend. Industrial production
is obtained from FRED (mnemonic INDPRO) and is a national aggregate. Nominal Retail
Sales are obtained from the Federal Reserve Bulletin and refer to the New York Federal




Bonds and Real Estate Other/Stocks
Corr(•, IP ) Corr(•, RS) Corr(•, IP ) Corr(•, RS) Corr(•, IP ) Corr(•, RS)
POS .43*** .11 .68*** .83*** .14 .23
(.18) (.28) (.21) (.07) (.14) (.18)
NEG -.09 .13 -.47** -.36 -.34** -.23
(.23) (.13) (.22) (.28) (.18) (.33)
EXC .27 .25 .54*** .65*** -.03 .19
(.26) (.18) (.21) (.18) (.17) (.25)
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Table 2.6: Spurious Credit Destruction: Probit Analysis of exiting banks
Standard errors clustered by bank are reported in parenthesis. The dependent variable is
a dummy that take a value of 1 for state banks that merge with national banks and exit
the sample (i.e. become nationally chartered) and for state banks which switch to a
national charter. These switches generate spurious credit destruction and there are a total
of 25 instances in which this occurs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆li,t−1 -0.354* -0.457 -0.491 - - -
(0.211) (0.303) (0.404) - - -
∆li,t−4 - - - -0.664 -0.921 -0.930
- - - (0.499) (0.709) (0.897)
li,t−1 0.0949** 0.0817* 0.120** 0.0923** 0.0780* 0.114**
(0.0380) (0.0443) (0.0536) (0.0379) (0.0445) (0.0530)
New York City 0.490*** 0.730*** - 0.503*** 0.750*** -
(0.163) (0.193) - (0.163) (0.193) -
Constant -4.757*** -4.057*** -3.755*** -4.712*** -4.018*** -3.654***
(0.548) (0.701) (0.965) (0.545) (0.704) (0.951)
Time fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 27,203 5,573 991 27,209 5,573 991
Table 2.7: Spurious Credit Creation: Probit Analysis of entering banks
Standard errors clustered by bank are reported in parenthesis. The dependent variable is
a dummy that take a value of 1 for state banks acquiring national banks and maintaining
a state charter. These switches generate spurious credit creation and there are a total of 20
instances in which this occurs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆li,t−1 0.388* 0.449 0.0327 - - -
(0.201) (0.288) (0.655) - - -
∆li,t−4 - - - 0.387* 0.580 -1.153
- - - (0.230) (0.394) (0.854)
li,t−1 0.172*** 0.174*** 0.280*** 0.172*** 0.179*** 0.282***
(0.0422) (0.0491) (0.0776) (0.0424) (0.0502) (0.0778)
New York City 0.190 0.343 - 0.195 0.336
(0.179) (0.214) - (0.179) (0.214)
Constant -5.895*** -5.513*** -6.828*** -5.899*** -5.584*** -6.938***
(0.631) (0.837) (1.476) (0.635) (0.850) (1.491)
Time fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 27,178 5,833 918 27,184 5,834 918
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Table 2.8: Creation, Destruction and Excess Reallocation in NYS
In the left side of the table, we report the mean values and associated standard deviation
in parenthesis of the quarterly growth rate of gross credit creation, destruction and excess
reallocation. Mean and standards deviations are in percentage points. In the right side of
the table, we report contemporaneous correlations between HP filtered gross credit flows
and our measures of business cycle variation, industrial production and retail sales.
Standard errors are Newey-West standard errors with lag length set to 4 quarters.
Mean and variance Corr(•, IP ) Corr(•, RS)
Full Sample NY state Full Sample NY state Full Sample NY state
POS 4.74 4.27 .64*** .57** .86*** .86***
(2.77) (2.51) (.22) (.25) (.06) (.05)
NEG 3.64 2.34 -.49*** -.42 -.44 -.34
(2.46) (1.46) (.23) (.26) (.32) (.31)
EXC 4.71 3.46 .71*** .38 .68*** .54***
(2.14) (1.89) (.12) (.23) (.06) (.15)
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CHAPTER 3
Price dispersion over the business cycle: Evidence from the airline
industry - with Kristopher S. Gerardi and Adam H. Shapiro
3.1 Introduction
Economists have long been captivated by the fact that for many homogeneous goods, a
distribution of prices exists rather than a single price. Numerous empirical studies (for
example, Shepard (1991), Sorensen (2000), Stavins (2001), and Hendel and Nevo (2011))
and theoretical models (for example, Salop and Stiglitz (1982), Burdett and Judd (1983),
Holmes (1989), and Aguirre et al. (2010)) have been produced to better understand this
phenomenon, but its fundamental causes are still widely debated. This paper adds to the
empirical literature on this topic by providing evidence on how price dispersion moves
with the business cycle.1 Understanding how aggregate factors affect price dispersion may
ultimately provide economists with a better understanding of firms’ pricing decisions.
The airline industry has been the focus of many empirical studies on price dispersion
for a few important reasons. First, the airline industry is one in which firms are well known
to charge a distribution of prices for the same product. Thus, there exists a large degree
of price dispersion in the industry. Second, markets in the airline industry are cleanly
delineated by distinct routes, which allows researchers to empirically assess price disper-
sion through panel-data methods. Finally, high quality data on airline prices and costs at
relatively granular levels are publicly available.
In this study, we examine how various measures of price dispersion at the route level
in the airline industry are correlated with the business cycle, while controlling for variation
1Additional studies on the determinants of price dispersion include Baye et al. (2004), Goldberg and Ver-
boven (2001), Gaggero and Piga (2011), and Orlov (2011).
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in price dispersion that is likely due to other factors, such as market structure, fuel, and
cost variations. Our main result is that price dispersion moves pro-cyclically in the airline
industry. Using a fixed-effects estimation on a panel that spans almost two full business
cycles, we find that a rise in the output gap—a measure of the difference between nominal
GDP and “potential” GDP as defined by the Congressional Budget Office—of 1 percentage
point is associated with a 1.5 percent increase in the interquartile range, on average. A fall
in the average city-endpoint unemployment rate of one percentage point causes a 2.3 per-
cent rise in the interquartile range, on average. Our results are robust to a range of different
measures of price dispersion, including the Gini coefficient. Previous studies have found it
important to differentiate between legacy carriers, also known as “hub-and-spoke” carri-
ers, and low-cost carriers (LCCs), because they behave quite differently along dimensions
related to pricing, competition, and network formation. Interestingly, our results indicate
that price dispersion is more pro-cyclical for legacy carriers relative to LCCs.
There are a number of potential mechanisms that could cause price dispersion to move
pro-cyclically. With the available data on prices, costs, and purchaser demographics, we
are unable to single out any one particular mechanism as the sole contributor to this em-
pirical finding. For instance, since we do not observe many of the individual ticket charac-
teristics we cannot rule out the possibility that price dispersion varies due to a change in
the tickets consumers purchase. However, we are able to provide theoretical and empiri-
cal evidence that favors some explanations over others. In particular, we provide evidence
that pro-cyclical price dispersion may be a simple outcome of second-degree price dis-
crimination tactics. We also provide empirical evidence that downplays the importance
of stochastic-demand pricing (Eden (1990)). This result corresponds well with the recent
findings of Puller et al. (2009) who find that airline price dispersion is driven primarily
by second-degree price discrimination tactics, as opposed to stochastic-demand pricing
techniques.
This study is related to the growing literature on price dispersion in the airline indus-
try. It is also related to numerous microeconomic studies on pricing strategies and business
cycle conditions. For instance, Rotenmberg and Saloner (1986) theorize that during booms
firms may be less likely to collude since the benefits of cheating are higher, causing firms
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to cut prices. There are a number of empirical papers on this topic that document that
retail prices tend to fall during periods of peak demand (see Warner and Barsky (1995),
MacDonald (2000), Chevalier et al. (2003), and Nevo and Hatzitaskos (2006)). Another set
of theories, based on switching costs and brand loyalty show that during booms new cus-
tomers may enter the market causing demand to become more elastic and firms to lower
prices (see Bils (1989), Klemperer (1995), and Stiglitz (1984)). A third theory, put forth by
Greenwald et al. (1984) and analyzed by Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996), shows that dur-
ing recessions cash-strapped firms may forego offering low prices to attract new customers
in order to generate a higher cash flow.
Although our empirical analysis is confined to one industry, we believe it likely has
implications for other industries as well. If the correlation between airline price dispersion
and measures of the business cycle that we document is due in part to price discrimina-
tion tactics, then we would expect to find pro-cyclical price dispersion in industries that
are characterized by firms with market power and the ability to implement discriminatory
pricing strategies such as hotels, stadiums, restaurants, theaters (Leslie (2004)), yellow-
page advertising (Busse and Rysman (2005)), cement (Miller and Osborne (2010)) and per-
sonal computers (Aizcorbe and Shapiro (2010)).
The paper is structured as follows: Section 3.2 contains a detailed discussion of the
data. In Section 3 we perform a fixed-effects, panel estimation of the relationship between
price dispersion and various proxies for the business cycle. In Section 4 we provide a
discussion of our empirical findings, paying particular attention to two leading theories
of price dispersion: price discrimination and stochastic-demand pricing. We conclude in
Section 5.
3.2 Data
The empirical analysis focuses on domestic, direct, coach-class airline tickets over the pe-
riod 1993q1 to 2009q4. The sample is constructed in the same manner as in Gerardi and
Shapiro (2009) and includes nine major domestic airlines, often referred to as “legacy carri-
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ers,”2 as well as a number of low-cost carriers3 (LCCs) and regional carriers. Ticket prices
represent 10 percent of all domestic tickets issued by airlines and are obtained from the
DB1B database. In addition to ticket prices, the DB1B includes other quarterly itinerary in-
formation, such as origin and destination airports, passenger quantities, number of stops
(plane changes), and fare class.4 Tickets less than 20 dollars are believed to be frequent-
flyer tickets and are eliminated.
The data is a panel, where an observation is a flight conducted by a specific airline,
between an origin and destination airport (route), in a specific time period (year and quar-
ter). For example, an American Airlines direct, coach-class ticket, from Dallas (DFW) to
San Francisco (SFO) in the first quarter of 1999 is considered an observation in our data.
The direct ticket data include both one-way flights and round-trip flights. The DB1B con-
tains numerous itineraries and fares for the same flight by the same carrier, reflecting the
quarterly frequency of the data, as well as the many different fares found within the same
fare class, on the same flight, at a given point in time. Thus, the data comprise distri-
butions of prices for carrier-route itineraries.5 Price dispersion is measured using three
separate proxies: the interquartile range, the Gini coefficient, and the 90th and 10th price
percentiles estimated separately. The interquartile range and Gini coefficient are advan-
tageous in that they summarize dispersion with one statistic, while the price percentiles
have the advantage that they provide more detailed information about the tails of the dis-
tribution.
Table 3.1 displays summary statistics of the variables that we include in our regression
analysis. The mean Gini coefficient in our entire sample is 0.22, and is 0.25 for legacy carri-
ers and 0.17 for LCCs. The Gini coefficient can be shown to be equal to twice the expected
absolute difference between two ticket prices drawn randomly from the population. For
2The legacy carriers in our sample include United, US Airways, Delta, American, Alaskan, TWA, Conti-
nental, Northwest, and America West.
3The list of LCCs, obtained from Ito and Lee (2003), includes Air South, Access Air, AirTran, American
Trans Air, Eastwind, Frontier, JetBlue, Kiwi, Morris Air, National, Pro Air, Reno, Southwest, Spirit, Sun Coun-
try, ValuJet, Vanguard, and Western Pacific. For a more detailed discussion of LCCs see Goolsbee and Syverson
(2008).
4There are three different sub-components to the DB1B data set. They are market data, coupon data,
and ticket data; and we combine variables from all three. For further reference, see the BTS’s website
http://www.transtats.bts.gov.
5See Appendix B for more details on the construction of the dataset, and Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) for an
even more detailed description.
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example, the median Gini coefficient for the entire data set is 0.225, which corresponds to
an expected fare difference of 45 percent of the mean fare for two randomly selected pas-
sengers. The mean interquartile range (IQR) is 92 dollars for our entire sample, and is 112
dollars for legacy carriers and 52 dollars for LCCs. Figure 3.1 plots the passenger-weighted
average of the IQR over the sample period, along with the output gap, as measured by
the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). The average degree of price dispersion rises with
the boom in the late 1990s and then falls with the ensuing recession. Dispersion is flat
throughout the mid 2000s, during which time the output gap was roughly zero, and then
dispersion falls somewhat with the latest recession in 2008.
We present a few graphical examples of the pricing patterns seen in the data in or-
der to show a more granular detail of the dynamics of price dispersion. Figure 3.2 plots
price percentiles of three routes along with a plot of the output gap. The output gap is
defined as the log difference between the actual nominal GDP and the CBO’s measure of
potential output. The top two panels correspond to routes operated by two legacy carriers,
American Airlines and Delta Airlines, while the bottom panel consists of a route operated
by Southwest Airlines. It is noteworthy that in the legacy carrier panels, the higher price
percentiles seem to closely follow the output gap. The top portion of the price distribu-
tion rises and falls with the boom in the late 1990s and then begins to gradually fall as
aggregate demand deteriorates. In contrast, we do not see the same relationship in the
Southwest panel.
3.2.1 Operating Cost
As we are interested in studying variation in price dispersion that cannot be explained
by variation in airline operating costs alone, we must include a control for the airlines’
marginal cost in our empirical analysis. Airline marginal costs may vary over the busi-
ness cycle for many reasons. For instance, wages of pilots and flight attendants may rise
during booms, as may the price of fuel. We proxy for variations in marginal cost using
a measure of the carrier’s average variable cost. Numerous studies, such as Caves et al.
(1984) and Gillen et al. (1990), have found that the carriers’ passenger output displays
constant-returns-to-scale in firm size. This finding suggests that average variable cost may
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be a valid approximation to marginal cost in this context. We exploit the rich cost data
available in the BTS P-52 database. Specifically, the BTS defines a measure called the “total
aircraft operating cost,” which includes fuel, crew wages, maintenance, aircraft leasing,
and depreciation. We are also able to decompose this variable into its fuel component and
its other components. Due to the large market power of unions in the airline industry,
non-fuel costs are particularly rigid relative to fuel costs.
Figure 3.3 plots total aircraft operating cost (including fuel) as a proportion of total
seat-miles for four carriers over the sample period. The figure shows that cost per seat-mile
is correlated across firms, and has generally increased through the course of the sample
period. The large rise and fall in costs in 2008 can be attributed to the spike in oil prices that
occurred during that summer. Southwest and JetBlue, the two largest LCCs in our sample,
have lower cost levels relative to the two legacy carriers, US Airways and United. This
differentiation in cost between legacies and LCCs is ubiquitous across the entire airline
industry. Table 3.1 provides summary statistics for our cost measures used in the empirical
analysis. Total aircraft operating cost (less fuel) as a proportion of total seat-miles, COST ,
are higher on average for legacy carriers: 3.4 cents per seat-mile for legacy carriers as
opposed to 2.8 cents per seat mile for LCCs. However, fuel costs (FUEL), measured as
price per gallon, are higher for LCCs. Overall, including a proxy for marginal cost in the
empirical specification removes any variation in price dispersion induced by variation in
tangible costs.
3.3 Estimation
Since the data is a panel of airline-route observations, it is possible to assess the effects
of business cycle variation on price dispersion while holding fixed time-invariant, route-
specific factors, as well as any route-specific variation in the degree of competition and
carrier-specific variation in fuel and other operating costs. We use a fixed-effects panel
estimator, which exploits the time-series variation along a specific route in the estimation
routine. We use two different approaches to measure the effect of business cycle variation
on price dispersion.
96
The first specification takes the form:
DISPijt = θ0+β∗Y GAPt+γ1∗ĤERF jt+γ2 lnFUELit+γ3 lnCOSTit+δq+νij+εijt (3.1)
where i indexes the carrier, j the route, t the specific time period, and q the quarter. In this
specification, the output gap, Y GAPt is used to proxy for the business cycle, as measured
by the CBO, and carrier-route fixed effects are represented as νij . We include the Herfind-
ahl index, ĤERF jt, to control for variation in market concentration of the route. As this
measure is endogenous, we instrument using the same variables as in Borenstein and Rose
(1994) and Gerardi and Shapiro (2009). These instruments include the total number of en-
planed passengers on the route, a measure of predicted concentration, and a measure of
the airline’s share of enplaned passengers at both endpoints. These variables are meant to
capture exogenous variation in the degree of competition that are not directly correlated
with the firm’s pricing decision. We control for time-series variation in costs on a specific
carrier i with the logarithm of the carrier’s average fuel cost per gallon, lnFUELit, as
well as the remaining operating cost per seat-mile, lnCOSTit, measured by the BTS for a
specific carrier. We also include quarter dummies, δq, to control for seasonal fluctuations.
The second specification takes the form:
DISPijt = θ0+β ∗URjt+γ1 ∗ ĤERF jt+γ2 lnFUELit+γ3 lnCOSTit+δq+νij +εijt (3.2)
where the average unemployment rate of the two endpoint states on the route obtained
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, URjt, is used as an alternative proxy for the business
cycle. In both specifications, price dispersion, DISPijt, is measured in three different ways:
the logarithm of the interquartile range, the Gini log-odds ratio,6 and the 90th and 10th
percentiles, each estimated in separate regressions. Analyzing the top and bottom of the
price distribution separately provides additional information regarding the source of the
change in price dispersion. Observations are weighted by the total number of passengers






an unbounded statistic. No results change when the log of the Gini coefficient is used instead. See Hayes and
Ross (1998) for further discussion.
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on the route over the entire sample period and standard errors are clustered by route in
order to control for autocorrelation as well as correlation between carriers on the same
route. For robustness purposes, we ran specification (3.1) clustering by time period. This
level of clustering accounts for any arbitrary correlation in the residuals by time period.
Estimates of the coefficient on the output gap remain statistically significant at the 1 percent
level.
3.3.1 Results
Table 3.2 contains estimation results for both specifications, using the logarithm of the in-
terquartile range and the Gini log-odds ratio as the dependent variable. We report results
for all direct routes in the 17-year sample.7 The effect of a rise in the business cycle—
as measured by the output gap—on price dispersion is positive and significant at the 1-
percent significance level. The estimate indicates that a one percentage point rise in the
output gap (i.e. from 0.01 to 0.02) is associated with an increase in the interquartile range
by 1.56 percent and the Gini log-odds ratio by 0.011. The results from the second spec-
ification are similar to the first, indicating that a decrease in the unemployment rate is
associated with an increase in the amount of price dispersion on a given route.8 A one
percentage point fall in the unemployment rate is associated with a 2.27 percent increase
in the interquartile range.
A look at the estimates from the percentile regressions in Table 3.3 sheds further light
on the manner in which price dispersion follows the business cycle. The estimates show
that the output gap is positively correlated with the 90th-percentile price level but is not
positively correlated with the 10th-percentile price level. An increase in the output gap by
one percentage point is associated with a 1.16 percent increase in the 90th percentile price,
but is not correlated with the 10th percentile price. Similarly, a fall in the unemployment
rate by 1 percentage point is associated with a 1.37 percent increase in the 90th percentile
7This sample includes 154,407 carrier-route observations when using ln(IQR) as the dependent variable
and 156,038 carrier-route observations using the Gini log-odds ratio. The reason for the slight decrease in the
number observations is that observations in which the interquartile range was equal to zero were necessarily
dropped.
8This sample includes 153,706 carrier-route observations when using ln(IQR) as the dependent variable
and 155,331 carrier-route observations using the Gini log-odds ratio. We have fewer observations in this
specification because we do not have unemployment information for American Samoa or St. Thomas.
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price, while there is a statistically significant, but small -0.339 percent negative correlation
between the unemployment rate and the 10th percentile price.
As in Gerardi and Shapiro (2009), we find that the effect of a decrease in competition—
as measured by an increase in market concentration ln ĤERF—on price dispersion is pos-
itive and significant at the 1-percent significance level. There also appears to be interesting
dynamics occurring on the cost side. Fuel costs seem to filter into both the 10th percentile
prices and 90th percentile prices, while the slower moving operating costs filter only into
the 90th percentile prices. There are many plausible stories that could explain this result.
One possibility may be that carriers simply find it easier to pass costs on to the more price-
insensitive consumers as they are more likely to lose the more price-sensitive consumers
to competition.
As an additional exercise, we split our sample between legacy carriers and low-cost
carriers (LCCs). Legacy carriers tend to implement different pricing strategies compared
to the LCCs, so it is important to assess whether the type of carrier plays an important role
in how price dispersion varies with the business cycle. For instance, some legacy carriers
offer “economy-plus,” which offers passengers more leg room, separate access through
security, and/or early boarding. To determine whether these different types of carriers ac-
tually price differently over the business cycle, we re-estimate the main econometric spec-
ification for each sample separately. The estimates divided by carrier type are reported in
the Table 3.4 and show that most of the effects from the business cycle on price dispersion
in the full sample of routes stem from the legacy carriers. The effect of the output gap
on the interquartile range is slightly larger than two times the magnitude in the sample
of legacy carriers (β̂1 = 2.335 compared to the estimated effect in the sample of LCCs β̂1 =
0.965).
Overall, the fixed-effects, panel estimates provide evidence of a positive relationship
between the business cycle and price dispersion in the airline industry. Furthermore, the
results show that the pro-cyclicality of price dispersion is largely driven by prices near the
top of the price distribution.
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3.4 Discussion
In this section, we discuss some potential explanations for our empirical findings. Because
the BTS does not provide detailed information on specific ticket or demographic character-
istics, we cannot unequivocally single out any one specific pricing mechanism. However,
we are able to provide empirical and theoretical evidence that favors certain explanations
over others. We focus on two widely discussed theories of price dispersion in the airline
industry: price discrimination and stochastic-demand pricing.
3.4.1 Second-Degree Price Discrimination
The practice of price discrimination is one of the leading explanations for price dispersion
in the airline industry. Airlines implement price discrimination techniques by segmenting
heterogeneous groups of consumers and charging them distinct prices for a homogeneous
product. Advance purchase requirements, non-refundable tickets, and Saturday-night lay-
overs are a few examples of restrictions that airlines use to identify passengers with differ-
ent price elasticities of demand. Since high-income or business consumers tend to place a
high value on their time, they are more likely to purchase more expensive tickets without
such restrictions. By making use of these techniques, airlines are able to separate price-
sensitive travelers from price-insensitive travelers.
Using a parsimonious framework of second-degree price discrimination, we illustrate
below that pro-cyclical price dispersion may be a side-effect of second-degree price dis-
crimination. Specifically, under plausible assumptions of the utility function, a price dis-
criminatory pricing policy implies that prices in the upper tail of the price distribution will
be more sensitive to aggregate income fluctuations than prices in the lower tail. This sug-
gests that price dispersion will positively covary with aggregate income when firms are
price discriminating between consumers with different willingness-to-pay.
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Consumers
Consider a simple model where consumers differ in their level of income, y. A consumer
solves the following constrained utility maximization problem:
max
d∈{0,1}
d · x+ u(m) (3.3)
subject to:
y = m+ d · p
where x represents the valuation of the ticket, which for now we assume is a constant. The
variable m represents the numeraire commodity and d represents the consumer’s decision
to buy or not buy the good. Note that u(·) is the functional form representing the manner
in which the consumer values the numeraire commodity relative to the discrete good, and
we assume that it displays the conventional properties: u′(y) > 0 and u′′(y) < 0. It follows
that the indirect utility function for the case in which the consumer purchases the discrete
good (d = 1) is given by:
U = x+ u(y − p). (3.4)
As in Tirole (1988), we make the assumption that a consumer’s income is very large rel-
ative to the consumer’s valuation, x, and subsequently to the equilibrium price charged.
This allows us to take a first-order Taylor expansion around p∗ = 0, which under the as-
sumption that y − p ≈ y, yields:
U = x+ u(y)− u′(y)p. (3.5)
It follows that for a given consumer to be better off consuming the good, it must be the
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To simplify the firm’s problem we assume two types of consumers and two types of tickets.
The results below can be easily generalized to N types of consumers and N types of tickets.
We assume there exists a share α of high income consumers with income yh and a share
1 − α of low income consumers with income yl. Quality is indexed by v, and we assume
that there exists a high quality ticket, x1, and a low quality ticket, x2. For instance, v = 2
indicates a ticket that has an advance purchase requirement or Saturday-night stayover
requirement, while v = 1 indicates a less restrictive ticket. It follows that with positive
time costs, the net quality of v = 1 will be higher than that of v = 2 such that x1 > x2.
The firm’s problem in the two-consumer-type case is to maximize profits given con-
sumer demand derived above. The firm has the option to separate the market by offering
different types of tickets. To obtain a separating equilibrium, the firm must be able to sep-
arate the market and also find it profit-maximizing to do so. It follows from Mussa and
Rosen (1978) and Tirole (1988) that optimal incentive-compatible prices satisfy:
p∗1 = bhx1 − (bh − bl)x2 (3.7)







. As the high-income consumer values x2 more
than the low-income consumer, the firm must lower the price of x1 to dissuade the high-
income consumer from deviating and purchasing the lower quality ticket, x2. Specifically,
the price is lowered by the extra utility the high-income consumer would have received
over the low-income consumer by consuming x2, (bh − bl)x2. This lower price ensures
that the high-income consumer does not purchase x2 instead of x1 (this ensures that the
equilibrium is incentive compatible).9
9Maskin and Riley (1984) deal with a more general case where there is a choice over both quality and quan-
tity. The authors show that the optimal quantity level is a function of the underlying quality. This implies that
when consumers are allowed to make choices over both quantity and quality, it is optimal for the monopolist
to offer a price schedule such that for a given quality level, he offers a unique quantity level associated with
it, so that in fact consumption choices are made discrete. Hence vis à vis our discrete choice framework, the
necessary correction would be taking into account the possibility of discrete quantity differences between the
two consumer types.
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Price sensitivities to a change in income, y, will be:
∂p∗1
∂y


















are Arrow-Pratt measures of absolute
risk-aversion (ARA) evaluated at income levels yh and yl, respectively. As the ARA will
be positive as long as consumers have diminishing marginal utility of income, it follows
from (3.1) and (3.2) that prices at the upper end of the distribution will be more sensitive to
income shocks than prices in the bottom portion of the distribution. By contrast, if the firm
chooses a uniform pricing strategy and wishes to sell to all consumers (i.e. both high- and
low-income consumers), it must set a price in accordance with the low-income consumer’s
preference parameter, bl. For instance, if the firm chooses to sell only the low-quality ticket,
it would set a uniform price blx2. If it chooses to sell only the high-quality ticket it would
set a uniform price blx1. In the former case, average price sensitivity under a uniform pric-
ing strategy will be less than the average price sensitivity under a discriminatory pricing
strategy as long as α > 0. In the latter case, this will be true only if α > Albl
Ahbh
.
The price range between the high and low price ticket (a measure of price dispersion
similar to the interquartile range) is:
D = p1 − p2 = bh(x1 − x2). (3.11)



















which is simply the coefficient of relative risk aversion (CRA) evaluated at yh. As long
as the CRA is positive (i.e. diminishing marginal utility of income), price dispersion will
widen with an increase in aggregate income. It is important to note that this result is
also sensitive to the choice of the utility function. Specifically, it will only hold for utility
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functions with the property that the consumer’s willingness-to-pay increases jointly with
both quality and income.
The model also shows that second-degree price discrimination may cause pro-cyclical
price dispersion for reasons other than relative movements in price elasticities. For in-
stance, equation (3.11) implies that price dispersion will follow the business cycle if there
are relative movements in the non-price attributes of the good, x1 − x2, over the business
cycle. This could happen if time-costs are cyclical, or more generally speaking, if there are
complementarities with certain ticket characteristics and business cycle conditions. Over-
all, this framework shows that price discriminatory tactics can cause price dispersion to
widen during economic booms due to (1) movements in price elasticities or (2) movements
in the non-price attributes of the good (that is, x). Since the DOT data does not include
many of the ticket characteristics and because we do not have demographic information
of the ticket purchasers, we cannot distinguish between these two effects.
An Empirical Exercise
To address the role of price-discriminatory behavior in generating pro-cyclical price dis-
persion, we perform an additional empirical exercise. Specifically, we assess the impact of
consumer heterogeneity on the cyclicality of price dispersion by estimating equations (3.1)
and (3.2) on two subsamples of routes: a sample of routes that are characterized by signif-
icant consumer heterogeneity in willingness-to-pay, as well as a sample of routes in which
there is a more homogeneous consumer base. Ceteris paribus, there should be more oppor-
tunities to price discriminate in the former sample due to the presumed larger difference in
willingness-to-pay of the consumers. To be clear, this is not a formal test of the theoretical
model, but rather an additional specification of our empirical analysis of Section 3.1.
We decompose the full sample of routes into “big-city” routes and “leisure” routes,
which we believe correspond to markets with heterogeneous consumer bases and markets
with more homogeneous consumer bases, respectively. Since routes between large cities
tend to attract both business and leisure travelers, they tend to have a bimodal distribution
of prices while routes to largely leisure destinations, such as islands and beaches, tend to
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have unimodal price distributions and lower median prices.10 Thus, airlines may have
more opportunities to implement price discrimination strategies on these big-city routes
since they include relatively more high-income, business consumers. Furthermore, note
that equation (3.12) implies that dispersion on big-city routes will be more sensitive to the
cycle if the utility over income displays increasing relative risk aversion and less sensitive
to the cycle if it displays decreasing relative risk aversion.11 Table 3.1 shows summary
statistics for the explanatory variables in each of these two samples. The table shows that
costs are similar between the two samples, however, price dispersion is much larger in the
sample of big-city routes.
Tables 3.5 contains estimates of the correlation between the interquartile range of the
price distribution for a carrier-route observation and the business cycle for big-city routes
versus leisure routes. The estimates show that price dispersion is more closely tied with
the output gap and the average city-wide unemployment rate for the big-city route sample
than the leisure sample. For instance, in the big-city route sample, a one percentage point
rise in the output gap is associated with a 2.7 percent increase in the interquartile range,
while it is associated with a statistically insignificant 0.19 percent increase in the leisure
route sample. The effect of the unemployment rate on price dispersion is slightly larger in
the big-city sample, a coefficient of 2.8 compared to 2.3 in the leisure sample. This smaller
difference in magnitude of the coefficients may be due to the fact that, as opposed to the
output gap, the unemployment rate is specific to the economic conditions at the endpoint
cities.
3.4.2 Stochastic-Demand Pricing
Another important theory regarding the existence of price dispersion is that of stochastic-
demand pricing. If the carrier is constrained by capacity, then as more flights reach full
capacity, the expense of an additional passenger becomes very large as either a bigger
aircraft or an extra flight is needed to supply the extra seat-mile. Eden (1990) shows that
effect can induce price dispersion to rise in periods of peak demand when full capacity is
10For a full list of the cities in each sample as well as a detailed description of how these subsamples are
created see Gerardi and Shapiro (2009).
11This can be seen by taking the derivative of (3.12) with respect to yh.
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reached.
In discussing the effect of capacity constraints on pricing, it is useful to decompose
marginal cost into its two primary components, which we refer to as the passenger cost and
the capacity cost. If the aircraft is not operating at full capacity, then marginal cost is simply
equal to the passenger cost; the cost of adding an additional passenger to the airplane.
This cost is mostly made up of the extra fuel required to transport the additional weight
of the passenger, while other, lesser components include the in-flight costs of serving the
additional passenger (i.e. meals, snacks, etc.). However, if the airplane is operating at
full capacity, then marginal cost is equal to the direct cost of an additional passenger as
well as the more substantial cost of an additional flight. This cost is incurred regardless of
whether or not seats on the airplane are filled with passengers, while the passenger cost






βij , if capacity is not reached
βij + λij , if capacity is reached
where βij is the cost of serving an additional passenger one mile on route j by carrier i,
and λij is the cost of an additional flight (in seat-miles).
If airlines account for stochastic demand concerns in their pricing decisions, then ag-
gregate demand fluctuations could alter a firm’s expected probability of selling a ticket,
and subsequently alter the “effective” capacity cost. In particular, if ex-ante the carrier
is uncertain about the level of demand for a flight, then under price-setting commitments
and costly capacity, profit-maximizing behavior induces a distribution of prices rather than
a single price. The intuition is that if the firm were allowed to change price after the real-
ization of the state, then it would set a low price in the low-demand state and a high price
in the high-demand state. However, because the firm must commit to a menu of prices
ex-ante, its profit maximizing strategy is to assign multiple prices to specified quantities of
the good. That is, if a firm must pay costs irrespective of whether or not its output is sold,
then it has a large incentive to set higher prices on goods that are less likely to be sold.
Eden (1990) formalized a model in a setting of perfect competition where there is un-
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certainty regarding the number of agents who will show up to exchange goods in the
marketplace. In such a setting, goods are characterized by the probability that they will be
sold, and in equilibrium firms face a trade-off between price and the probability of sale. In
the model, equilibrium prices are given by the condition,







where ps is the price of the sth good, β is an operating cost that the firm must pay for each
good that it sells, λ is the unit capacity cost, and prob(sale) is the probability that good s
is sold. The second term on the right-hand side of the equation can be interpreted as an
“effective” capacity cost of good s, λeffs . This term implies that in competitive equilibrium,
firms are indifferent between selling a high-priced good with low probability and selling a
low-priced good with high probability. Dana (1999) extended Eden’s model to monopoly
and oligopoly market structures. With stochastic demand, the monopolist sets a higher
price for a good that sells only in high demand states since its effective cost is higher.
In this setting, when the carrier commits to prices ex-ante, the highest priced tickets—
tickets with the highest effective capacity cost—are not purchased until demand rises
sufficiently high to purchase all of the low priced tickets. Thus, if the carrier is pricing
solely with stochastic demand concerns, then peaks in aggregate demand will induce
higher price dispersion through the higher effective capacity cost of the remaining seats
on crowded aircraft.
An Empirical Exercise
To asses the empirical importance of stochastic-demand pricing in generating pro-cyclical
price dispersion we exploit the expected relationship between capacity utilization and
price dispersion that would arise if stochastic demand played an important role in airline
pricing tactics. Specifically, under stochastic-demand pricing, utilization should positively
co-vary with price dispersion because high-priced tickets would be purchased only when
aircraft are near full capacity.
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Figure 3.4 shows the mean aircraft capacity utilization rate over the sample period.
Interestingly, utilization has been steadily increasing over the course of the sample period,
fluctuating with some seasonal variation. As a formal test, we control for the effects of
stochastic-demand pricing on price dispersion by including a measure of carrier i’s uti-
lization rate on route j in our estimation routine, UTILijt. As this variable is potentially
endogenous, we also include specifications where we use instrumental variables. Specifi-
cally, we instrument for UTILijt using the utilization of route j in period t, UTILjt. This
variable should be correlated with airline i’s specific utilization rate due to variations in ag-
gregate demand for route j. As Figure 3.4 makes apparent, it may be important to remove
low frequency components from the utilization variable. Thus, we also include specifica-
tions with a de-trended measure of aircraft utilization, UTILdt.
12
We report results of this exercise using two measures of price dispersion. Estimates
using the logarithm of the interquartile range are reported in Table 3.6 and estimates with
the Gini-log odds ratio are reported in Table 3.7. In all specifications, the coefficient on
our measure of the business cycle is positive and statistically significant at the one-percent
level. Thus, holding fixed aircraft utilization, price dispersion remains pro-cyclical. These
estimates suggest that the pro-cyclicality of variation in airline price dispersion is likely
not tied to variation in capacity utilization. In turn, this suggests that stochastic-demand
pricing strategies do not explain our findings. While this analysis favors price discrimina-
tion as the explanation for the pro-cyclical nature of airline price dispersion, it is important
to stress that we can only favor certain explanations over others due to certain limitations
of the data. For instance, we use a monthly measure of capacity utilization at the carrier-
route level, whereas ideally, we would like capacity utilization measured at the flight level.
It is comforting to note, however, that our results correspond with recent work of Puller et
al. (2009) who use more granular ticket information.
12The measure UTILdt is measured by collecting the residuals from running a regression of utilization, util,
on a cubic-polynomial time trend and quarter dummies.
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3.5 Conclusion
In this paper we have documented that price dispersion is significantly pro-cyclical in the
airline industry. We show that the empirical results are consistent with a parsimonious
discrete-choice model of second-degree price discrimination. In addition, we implement
a few empirical exercises that provide support for this interpretation over others such as
stochastic demand pricing or pro-cyclical variation in airline costs. With the available data,
we cannot completely rule out other mechanisms that could create pro-cyclical behavior
in price dispersion. One such mechanism is changes in consumer behavior over the busi-
ness cycle. Even in the absence of variation in airlines’ pricing strategies over the business
cycle, if consumers simply purchase more expensive airline tickets with fewer restrictions
in boom periods and less expensive tickets with more restrictions in more depressed pe-
riods, then our measured degree of price dispersion would be expected to co-vary with
the business cycle. Future research on this topic will hopefully employ more detailed data
that will have the ability to distinguish between causal mechanisms, and thus determine if
price discrimination is the most important driver of price dispersion at the business cycle
frequency. Another potentially fruitful avenue for future research is to analyze price dis-
persion in other industries. If pro-cyclical price dispersion is largely due to price discrim-
ination tactics, then we would expect to find pro-cyclical price dispersion in industries in
which firms rely on price discriminatory strategies, such as hotels, stadiums, restaurants,
theaters, yellow-page advertising, cement, and personal computers.
Another interesting extension of this study would be to assess whether price discrim-
inatory tactics act to accentuate the degree to which airline profits fluctuate over the busi-
ness cycle. Given the high volatility of profits over the course of the last two decades as
well as the large number of bankruptcies by legacy carriers, the airline industry seems par-
ticularly sensitive to aggregate demand conditions. But while legacy carriers have strug-
gled, the LCCs have somehow managed to stay profitable during this era. One possibility
is that the large profit swings of legacy carriers relative to LCCs are, in part, attributable to
differences in the reliance on price discriminatory tactics, as LCCs such as Southwest and




• lnP (k)ijt - The logarithm of the kth price percentile of carrier i on route j in period t,
obtained from the DB1B.
• ln IQRijt - The logarithm of the interquartile range, given by P (75)ijt - P (25)ijt,
where P (k)ijt is the price percentile of carrier i on route j in period t, obtained from
the DB1B.
• Giniloddijt - The Gini log-odds ratio, given by Gloddijt = ln(
Gij
1−Gij ), where Gijt is the Gini
coefficient of carrier i’s price distribution on route j in period t, calculated using data
from DB1B.
• lnHERFjt - The logarithm of the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of route j in period t,
calculated using passenger shares obtained from the DB1B.
• Y GAPt - The log of nominal GDP in period t minus the log of nominal potential GDP
in period t, as measured by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO).
• URjt - The average metropolitan unemployment rate in period t of the origin and
destination state of route j, obtained from Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
• lnFUELit - The average cost per gallon fuel by carrier i in period t, obtained from
the BTS P-52 database.
• lnCOSTit - Total operating costs minus total fuel costs divided by total seat-miles for
carrier i in period t, obtained from the BTS P-52 database.
• UTILijt - The capacity utilization rate of carrier i on route j in period t measured by
total passengers divided by total seats. Obtained from the T-100 database.
• UTILdt - The de-trended capacity utilization rate of carrier i on route j in period t
measured as the residual from the regression of utilijt on a cubic-polynomial time
trend and quarter dummies.
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Instruments
• lnPASSRTEjt - The logarithm of total enplaned passengers on route j in period t
from the T-100 Domestic Segment Databank.
• IRUTHERF - This instrument is identical to one used by Borenstein and Rose
(1994). This variable is the square of the fitted value for MKTSHAREijt from
its first-stage regression, plus the rescaled sum of the squares of all other carrier’s














, where k indexes all airlines, j is the observed airline,
and ENPk1 and ENPk2 are airline k’s average quarterly enplanements at the two
endpoint airports. This instrument is similar to one used by Borenstein and Rose
(1994), with the difference being that Borenstein and Rose use average daily enplane-
ments, while we use average quarterly enplanements, as a result of data availability.
Data on enplanements were obtained from the T-100 Domestic Segment Databank.
Data Construction
In this appendix, we discuss our methods and assumptions involved in constructing our
panel of airline-route ticket observations from the DB1B and T-100 Domestic Segment
databases maintained by the BTS at their online website, Transtats. There are three dif-
ferent sub-components to the DB1B data set. They are market data, coupon data, and
ticket data, and we combine variables from all three sources.13
We use only domestic, coach-class itineraries and keep only tickets containing direct
flights.14 Direct flights typically account for 30 percent of the itineraries in the DB1B over
the course of our sample, with no apparent trend.
The BTS includes a variable that describes the reliability of each ticket price (“dollar
cred”). The variable takes on a value of 0 if the fare is of questionable magnitude, based
13For further reference, see the BTS’s website http://www.transtats.bts.gov.
14The sample of direct flights encompasses both non-stop flights and flights in which there is a stop but no
change of plane.
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on a set of limits defined by the BTS, and it takes a value of 1 if it is credible. We drop all
tickets for which this variable takes a value of zero.
The DB1B also provides limited information regarding the fare class of each ticket.
Each ticket is labeled as either coach-class, business-class, or first-class, and we eliminated
all first-class and business-class itineraries. Unfortunately, the DB1B does not have any
direct way of identifying frequent-flyer tickets, but there are indirect methods that have
been used in the previous literature, and we follow these in our analysis. First, we drop
all fares coded as 0. Next, we dropped all fares that are less than or equal to $20 ($10 for
one-way tickets).
In addition to eliminating frequent-flyer tickets and higher-class tickets, we also elim-
inate tickets in which the operating and ticketing carriers are different due to code sharing
arrangements. Code sharing is a practice where a flight operated by an airline is jointly
marketed as a flight for one or more other airlines. Due to the uncertainty regarding the
actual airline who is setting the price schedule in such an arrangement, we decided to
eliminate these itineraries. Code sharing first appears in the data in 1998:Q1. On average,
approximately 80 percent of the original number of direct tickets in the DB1B is retained
in the analysis.
After filtering the ticket data for each quarter of the DB1B, we combined tickets from
all 55 quarters and collapsed the data into airline-route observations. For example, if we
had 10,000 United Airline tickets between Boston and Los Angeles in 1993:Q1, we calcu-
lated summary statistics (such as the Gini coefficient), and collapsed the data into a single
observation corresponding to a United Airlines flight between Boston and Los Angeles in
1993:Q1.
The merge between the DB1B and T-100 Segment databases was not exact (around 45
percent matched). First, since the DB1B does not provide complete coverage for all airlines
and routes, there are a number of direct routes in the T-100 data that we do not find in the
DB1B (especially low-volume routes). Second, the DB1B does not allow us to distinguish
between a non-stop, direct ticket and a ticket that involves a stop without a plane change.
For example, if a passenger takes a flight from Boston to Orlando that stops in Atlanta, but
does not involve a plane change, his itinerary will look identical to that of a passenger who
112
flies from Boston to Orlando without any stops. For this reason, we identified some airline
routes as direct in the DB1B, that are not non-stop, and therefore do not have segment
information in the T-100 data. While we lose many airline-route observations during the
merge as a result, we believe that this merge actually provides a nice filter, since we would
ideally like to use only non-stop, direct flights. Thus, by merging data between the DB1B
and the T-100, we likely eliminate a large proportion of flights that are direct, but not non-
stop due to a plane change.
In an effort to eliminate possible coding errors, we drop certain airline-route obser-
vations from the data that we believe do not have adequate coverage to calculate reliable
price dispersion statistics. We drop any airline-route observation that does not have at least
100 passengers in the DB1B. Furthermore, for each airline route observation, we calculate
the average number of passengers over time in both the DB1B and the T-100 Segment
databases. If the number of passengers on an airline route in a given quarter falls below
25 percent of its mean over time in one of the databases, but not in the other, then we drop
the observation from our data, on the basis that its value is most likely measurement error.
However, if the number of passengers on an airline route in a given quarter falls below 25
percent of its mean in both the DB1B and the T-100 Segment databases, then we keep the
observation in our data.
Finally, we addressed the issue of “double counting.” Since we defined a route as
a directional trip in our data, any round-trip ticket would count twice. For example, a
round-trip fare from Boston to San Francisco would appear twice in the data — once as
BOS-SFO and once as SFO-BOS. Since this would have no effect on the consistency of our
estimates, but a significant effect on the size of our standard errors, we chose to drop one
of the directions. Of course, the drawback of this assumption is that some one-way fares




Figure 3.1: Price Dispersion over the Business Cycle
Depicted as a grey line is the passenger-weighted average of the interquartile range for all
routes in the DB1B database. The solid black line is the five-quarter moving average. The
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Figure 3.3: Aircraft Operating Costs
Depicted are total aircraft operating cost (including fuel) in dollars per seat-mile for four
carriers: US Airways, United Airlines, JetBlue, and Southwest.
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Figure 3.4: Aircraft Utilization Rate
Depicted as a grey line is aircraft utilization, measured as total passengers divided by
total available seats from the BTS T100 database, for each quarter in the sample period.
The black line depicts a moving average of this measure. The output gap, as measured by
the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) is depicted as a dashed line.
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Tables
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
The interquartile range (IQR), 90th percentile price (90th Pctl.), 10th percentile price (10th Pctl.),
and fuel cost per gallon (FUEL) are reported in dollars. Total operating fuel cost less fuel per
seat-mile (COST) is reported in cents.
Full Sample Legacy LCC Big-City Leisure
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Gini 0.22 0.08 0.25 0.07 0.17 0.05 0.25 0.08 0.19 0.07
IQR 92 83 112 92 52 27 117 105 64 51
90th Perc. Price 278 161 327 170 178 70 338 201 232 125
10th Perc. Price 95 39 102 40 80 29 99 37 98 48
HERF 0.76 0.25 0.75 0.25 0.77 0.25 0.67 0.24 0.77 0.25
COST 3.25 0.81 3.37 0.59 2.83 0.52 3.27 0.65 3.21 0.88
FUEL 1.26 0.98 1.15 0.82 1.45 0.76 1.24 0.84 1.41 1.36
UTIL 0.69 0.15 0.69 0.15 0.69 0.15 0.69 0.15 0.73 0.15
Table 3.2: Full Sample Estimates
All regressions include carrier-route-specific dummies and quarter dummies. Standard errors are
in parentheses and are clustered by route to account for both autocorrelation and correlation
between carriers on the same route. One, two, and three asterisks indicate significance at the






ln ĤERF 0.261*** 0.258*** 0.079*** 0.076***
(0.043) (0.043) (0.023) (0.023)
ln FUEL 0.046*** 0.034*** -0.042*** -0.052***
(0.015) (0.016) (0.009) (0.009)
ln COST 0.135** 0.114** 0.450*** 0.436***
(0.061) (0.057) (0.030) (0.030)
Observations 154407 153706 156038 155331
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Table 3.3: Full Sample Estimates: Percentiles
All regressions include carrier-route-specific dummies and quarter dummies. Standard errors are
in parentheses and are clustered by route to account for both autocorrelation and correlation
between carriers on the same route. One, two, and three asterisks indicate significance at the






ln ĤERF 0.299*** 0.296*** 0.218*** 0.218***
(0.029) (0.029) (0.015) (0.014)
ln FUEL 0.034*** 0.024*** 0.097*** 0.097***
(0.011) (0.012) (0.005) (0.005)
ln COST 0.292** 0.276** -0.015 -0.016
(0.034) (0.033) (0.016) (0.015)
Observations 156038 155331 156038 155331
Table 3.4: Panel Estimates by Carrier Type
The dependent variable is the logarithm of the interquartile range. All regressions include
carrier-route-specific dummies and quarter dummies. Standard errors are in parentheses and are
clustered by route to account for both autocorrelation and correlation between carriers on the
same route. One, two, and three asterisks indicate significance at the 10 per cent, 5 per cent, or 1






ln ĤERF 0.191*** 0.185*** 0.311*** 0.315***
(0.048) (0.048) (0.039) (0.039)
ln FUEL -0.006 -0.027 0.225*** 0.215***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.013) (0.012)
ln COST 0.069 0.029 0.579*** 0.597***
(0.045) (0.045) (0.042) (0.043)
Observations 105636 104994 40941 40926
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Table 3.5: Panel Estimates by Route Type
The dependent variable is the logarithm of the interquartile range. All regressions include
carrier-route-specific dummies and quarter dummies. Standard errors are in parentheses and are
clustered by route to account for both autocorrelation and correlation between carriers on the
same route. One, two, and three asterisks indicate significance at the 10 per cent, 5 per cent, or 1






ln ĤERF 0.334*** 0.329*** 0.195*** 0.209***
(0.078) (0.079) (0.048) (0.053)
ln FUEL -0.054** -0.080** 0.190*** 0.194***
(0.024) (0.026) (0.027) (0.031)
ln COST 0.093 0.047 -0.085 -0.075
(0.070) (0.070) (0.162) (0.151)
Observations 43614 43614 35312 34611
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Table 3.6: Estimates with Capacity Utilization Control: IQR
All regressions include carrier-route-specific dummies and quarter dummies. IV estimates indicate that UTIL and UTILdt were instrumented using
utilization at the route-quarter level. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered by route to account for both autocorrelation and




YGAP 1.896*** 2.161*** 1.923*** 2.196***
(0.213) (0.217) (0.216) (0.227)
-UR 2.687*** 3.007*** 2.721*** 3.055***
(0.281) (0.287) (0.279) (0.275)
UTIL -1.122*** -1.121*** -1.211** -1.213***
(0.084) (0.081) (0.101) (0.096)
UTILdt -1.217*** -1.208*** -1.286*** -1.287***
(0.077) (0.0703) (0.109) (0.104)
lnĤERF 0.239*** 0.236*** 0.235*** 0.231*** 0.241*** 0.240*** 0.237*** 0.234***
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
lnFUEL 0.120*** 0.055*** 0.104*** 0.037*** 0.126*** 0.055*** 0.110*** 0.037***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014)
lnCOST 0.173*** 0.096*** 0.148*** 0.067 0.176** 0.093* 0.150*** 0.063
(0.061) (0.055) (0.057) (0.052) (0.061) (0.055) (0.057) (0.051)
Observations 154390 154390 153689 153689 154390 154390 153689 153689
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Table 3.7: Estimates with Capacity Utilization Control: Gini
All regressions include carrier-route-specific dummies and quarter dummies. IV estimates indicate that UTIL and UTILdt were instrumented using
utilization at the route-quarter level. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered by route to account for both autocorrelation and




YGAP 1.235*** 1.375*** 1.233*** 1.301***
(0.106) (0.110) (0.105) (0.108)
-UR 1.752*** 1.923*** 1.751*** 1.833***
(0.155) (0.160) (0.155) (0.158)
UTIL -0.305*** -0.303*** -0.299*** -0.298***
(0.036) (0.036) (0.043) (0.043)
UTILdt -0.475*** -0.469*** -0.321*** -0.320***
(0.040) (0.040) (0.047) (0.047)
ln ĤERF 0.072*** 0.068*** 0.069*** 0.065*** 0.072*** 0.071*** 0.069*** 0.068***
(0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023)
lnFUEL -0.022*** -0.039*** -0.033*** -0.051*** -0.023*** -0.040*** -0.033*** -0.051***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
lnCOST 0.460*** 0.434*** 0.445*** 0.417*** 0.460*** 0.439*** 0.445*** 0.423***
(0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.028) (0.031) (0.029) (0.030) (0.028)
Observations 156021 156021 155314 155314 156021 156021 155314 155314
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